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Abstract 
Whilst there have been a variety of attempts to understand Thomas 
Merton’s psyche, there remains relatively little attention to his own 
research in psychology. By focusing on a number of lesser known 
writings by Merton, this thesis will address the question of the 
integration of psychology and religion in his work. I will argue first 
that the early Merton operates with a hierarchical distinction 
between ascetical theology and psychology, before examining the 
psychological ramifications of the developing turn to humanism in his 
work through his correspondence with and reading of Erich Fromm. 
First devoting a chapter to those of Fromm’s writings with which 
Merton was familiar, I will then draw on this material in order to 
suggest that the avowed humanist harmony between the two writers 
in fact evaporates when considered in light of theological positions 
explicit in their correspondence. Subsequently analysing several 
chapters written in the twilight of Merton’s life, the thesis ultimately 
challenges the claim that any asceticism-humanism tension is merely 
or primarily historical. Instead, an elaboration of how Merton’s final 
putative integration of psychology, religion, and humanism 
incorporates Christian eschatology and soteriology will help 
demonstrate that this tension is intratextual, enduring, and perhaps 
also intrapsychic. 
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Introduction 
 
Commenting on some 15th century ascetic practices, Thomas Merton writes in a 
1965 journal entry that “[d]epth psychology, etc, have made these things 
forever questionable – they belong to another age” (Merton, 1997: 210). Less 
than two months later, Merton would reflect in the same journal that “without 
our listening and attention and submission, in total self-renunciation and love for 
the Father’s will…our life is false and without meaning" (Merton, 1997: 226). It is 
these two themes – psychology and ascetical surrender to God – which will 
ultimately form the dialectical framework for this analysis of the integration of 
psychology and religion in the work of Thomas Merton.1 That Merton writes in a 
journal entry of 1958 that his “new fervour will be rooted not in asceticism but 
in humanism” (Merton, 1996: 237) suggests to us a third focus around which this 
dialectic develops, and which I will use to attempt to illuminate it. To prepare 
for this discussion, a general biography of Merton will be followed by a brief 
chronicle of his attitude to psychology, and an outline of the method employed 
in this thesis.2  
 
The first child of artists Owen and Ruth Merton, Thomas Merton was born in 
Prades, France, on 31st January, 1915, followed by his brother, John Paul, in 
1918. Merton’s mother died when he was barely six, and the subsequent decade 
saw Merton share the rather nomadic life of his father, mainly in Bermuda, 
France, and England. In 1929 – after a period of unhappy schooling in France - 
Merton entered Oakham School, and from here was granted a scholarship to 
                                                          
1 We are dealing with two rather nebulous concepts, a problem exacerbated by the fluidity of Merton’s use 
of terms. Rather than devoting space to a discussion of what the concepts of psychology and religion 
generally denote, I will use each word to encompass a number of those used by Merton. Hence, for 
psychology one might also read psychoanalysis, psychiatry, or psychotherapy. Religion will often take 
concrete form as Christianity or Catholicism. This solution circumvents the perennial problem of definition, 
and is flexible enough to avoid curtailing the number of appropriate sources.  
2 Biographical information from (Merton, 1990), (Moses, 2014), (Mott, 1984), and (Waldron, 2011). The 
account of his attitude to psychology is compiled from (Merton, 1990; 1995; 1996; 1996b; 1996c; 1997; 
1998), (Mott, 1984) and (Waldron, 2011). 
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enter Cambridge in 1933. Underwhelming examination results and dissatisfaction 
with the university lifestyle saw Merton return to the care of his maternal 
grandparents in the United States in 1934, and complete undergraduate and 
Master’s degrees in English Literature at Columbia University between 1935 and 
1939. Having long been a sporadic participant at Anglican and Quaker worship, 
Merton begins to take Catholic philosophical theology seriously whilst studying 
Etienne Gilson’s The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (Gilson, 1991), and was 
received into the Catholic Church in 1938. It is at this point that the art-ascesis 
dialectic apparent in Merton’s life and work begins to emerge clearly, as Merton 
commences both doctoral research and exploring the possibility of becoming a 
Franciscan friar.  
 
Following almost two years of uncertainty and struggle, Merton enters the Abbey 
of Our Lady of Gethsemani, Kentucky, in 1941, to begin the long process of 
becoming a permanent member of the Cistercian Order. Merton is drawn by the 
reputation for silence, austerity, and contemplation, but will continually 
question both the adequacy of the community and his own aptitude for this life. 
In 1948, having commenced study for priesthood, Merton published an 
autobiographical account of his life and entrance into the Church and monastic 
life, and is thrust into fame by its best-selling reception (Merton, 1975 [1948]).3 
Over approximately the next decade, Merton continued to write on traditional 
Catholic themes, but would later look back on this period with discomfort, 
critiquing the rigid and binary manner in which he had portrayed the secular 
world as bereft of God (Merton, 1996b: 161, 283; 1997: 225).4   
 
Until Merton’s journey to Asia in 1968, where he was to die a Cistercian priest in 
Bangkok on 10th December, his life is largely stable geographically. Viewed in 
literary, intellectual, spiritual, and existential terms, however, the picture is 
                                                          
3 Square brackets will contain the original date of publication where relevant. Unfortunately in the case of 
Merton some of the original dates remain unclear.  
4 Examples of Merton’s “movement from cloister to world” (Merton, 1996c: xix), can be seen by comparing 
texts such as (Merton, 1975: 73, 94, 117, 141f, 225, 252f; 1995: 135; 1996b: 128, 313, 283) with passages 
like (Merton, 1996b: 161, 287, 457; 1996c, 274; 1997: 225). 
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rather more roving, as his life is characterised by engagement with an enormous 
variety of people, ideas, cultures, and questions. Merton himself distinguishes 
three phases in his life (Merton, 2009:11-12): (i) from 1938 to 1949, monastic 
days of strict fervour, resulting “in a highly unworldly, ascetical, intransigent, 
somewhat apocalyptic outlook [and a] [r]igid, arbitrary separation between God 
and the world”; (ii) Between 1949 and the early 1960’s, Merton begins “to open 
up again to the world…reading psychoanalysis (Fromm, Horney, etc.), Zen 
Buddhism, existentialism, and other things like that, also more literature”; (iii) a 
third period in which the “fruits” of the second begin to emerge, and a series of 
publications concerned with political and social issues appear. This transition 
accounts for the presence of “two Mertons: one ascetic, conservative, 
traditional, monastic. The other radical, independent, and somewhat akin to 
beats and hippies and to poets in general” (Merton, 2009:12).5 This chronology 
should be borne in mind throughout this thesis, though we shall see that it is 
twisting rather than linear.  
 
Our record of Merton’s encounter with psychological writings begins in his own 
account of his years at Cambridge, where he reports reading “all the books of 
[Sigmund] Freud, [Carl] Jung, and [Alfred] Adler…the mysteries of sex-repression 
and complexes and introversion and extroversion” (Merton, 1975 [1948]: 137). As 
he describes this period here and in his early journals, he is both somewhat 
scathing about his own propensity to self-analysis (Merton, 1995: 96, 137), and – 
having entered Gethsemani - fairly positive about the value of understanding 
Freud and unconscious processes (Merton, 1996b: 196, 212, 389). This period 
(c.1948-9), however, is also psychologically noteworthy for the young Merton’s 
struggle against thought, desire, and emotion (Merton, 1996b: 377), perhaps 
indicating that the psychoanalytic studies had not quite been integrated into 
Merton’s self-understanding. And indeed, from Merton’s reading notebooks 
(Merton, 1956), and from biographical and autobiographical accounts of his 1956 
encounter with the Catholic psychoanalyst Gregory Zilboorg, we can see that the 
real personal engagement begins around 1955. On the recommendation of his 
                                                          
5 It is unclear whether this bifurcation describes Merton’s own self-understanding or his perception of his 
public reception. 
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friend and publisher Robert Giroux, Merton had sent his manuscript “The 
Neurotic Personality in the Monastic Life” to Zilboorg, whom he was 
subsequently to meet at a conference on psychiatry and religious life in July 
1956. Zilboorg was frank about his view of Merton, labelling him neurotic, 
stubborn, afraid of being ordinary, megalomaniac, narcissistic, and pathological, 
and his manuscript potentially harmful (Merton, 1996: 58f). Merton, both 
immediately and retrospectively, appreciated Zilboorg’s candour, but the 
meeting merely exacerbated his interior struggles and his distress over the 
question of whether he was neurotic (Merton, 1996: 364; 1996c: 320).  
 
Nonetheless, this period was intellectually and pastorally formative for Merton, 
as he is involved in the attempts of his community to use psychological testing 
for new aspirants (Merton, 1996: 69; 1996b: 298), recommends Jung to a 
correspondent (Merton, 1996:322), and reads – generally appreciatively – Jung 
(Merton, 1996: 327; 1996c: 237), Erich Fromm (Merton, 1985: 309ff; 1996: 377, 
384; 1996c: 151), Karen Horney (Merton, 1956; 1985: 309), and finally Freud’s 
“prophetic” Civilization and its Discontents (Merton, 1998: 82). Moreover, 
Merton undergoes his own period of analysis, with Jim Wygal (Merton, 1996: 364; 
Mott, 1984: 345, 364, 388, 455), and from 1956 begins to incorporate 
psychological themes in his writing, as we shall now see from my brief 
introduction to the structure of this thesis. 
 
In my first chapter, our initial encounter with Merton’s psychological writings 
will consider the posthumously published “The Neurotic Personality in the 
Monastic Life” (Merton, 1993). That this text was the manuscript that Zilboorg 
advised Merton to shelve (Mott, 1984: 194) immediately presents us with the 
problem of dating its content. The editor of the text, Merton’s monastic brother 
Patrick Hart, writes that it had been considerably revised (Merton, 1993: 4), but 
I have been unable to locate any evidence of this process in Merton’s journals or 
letters. Given that I will attempt to assess the question of an historical 
development in Merton’s approach to the relation between ascesis and 
psychoanalysis, this text is both central and questionable. Short of any 
9 
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statement from its author of a substantial revision before his death, however, I 
will proceed on the basis that it is a reliable account of Merton’s position in 
1956. This position upholds a hierarchical synthesis between psychoanalysis and 
ascetical theology, in which the treatment of neurosis, anxiety, and self-will, is 
seen as crucial to the development of a mature personality and the life of 
supernatural grace. The text, however, will be seen to harbour assumptions 
concerning the mortification of the flesh and the denial of the world. Hence it 
will be interpreted as somewhat transitional, at once a vestige from Merton’s 
first period and an example of his burgeoning openness to the secular world.   
 
Chapter Two will continue to chronicle this development, considering Merton’s 
“The Mature Conscience” (Merton and Bamberger, unpublished), and a chapter 
from his 1961 series of monastic conferences An Introduction to Christian 
Mysticism (Merton, 1988). In the former, the authors (Merton and fellow 
Cistercian John Eudes Bamberger, a doctor who was around this time in 
psychiatric training) consider the problem of psychological immaturity in the 
development of freedom and sanctity, drawing on developmental psychology and 
personalist philosophy. This flourishing synthetic approach gathers pace in the 
latter text, in which Merton includes accounts of counselling, psychotherapy, 
psychoanalysis, and individuation, in his otherwise traditional study of mysticism 
and spiritual direction. 
 
My third chapter will focus on the work of Erich Fromm, in order to prepare for a 
fourth and final chapter on the place of humanism, psychoanalysis, and 
eschatology in Merton’s reading of and dialogue with Fromm. In The Fear of 
Freedom, (Fromm, 2001 [1941]), and Man for Himself (Fromm, 1949), Fromm 
lays the foundation of a critique of authoritarianism in religion in his 
Psychoanalysis and Religion (Fromm, 1950). Given both the frequency of 
surrender to God in Merton’s writing, and his putative embrace of Fromm’s 
humanistic alternative to authoritarian political systems, conscience, and 
religion, I have chosen to elaborate and evaluate these texts in some depth in 
advance of an assessment of Merton’s extended written response in chapter four 
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(Merton, 1963; 1985). Here I will ask whether Merton’s appreciation and 
endorsement of Fromm’s views on humanism, psychoanalysis, and alienation, is 
not in fact compromised by his enduring commitment to Christian theology, 
eschatology, and anthropology. This question will be reiterated, and arguably 
reinforced, in closing the fourth chapter with an account of Merton’s review of 
Rezah Arasteh’s Final Integration in the Adult Personality (Arasteh, 1965; 
Merton, 1988b), in which I shall question whether Merton’s attempt at 
integration is ultimately sundered in an eschatology of disintegration. 
 
This question mark over integration clearly invites a further preliminary 
elaboration of my own method, and before proceeding to the first chapter I will 
now discuss the structure by which my research question will be formed and 
addressed. The paper will primarily be concerned with the matter of the 
integration of psychology and religion in the work of Thomas Merton, for the 
most part in the writings enumerated above but also drawing on journals and 
other texts where appropriate. In order to frame the question of integration, I 
will draw on the criteria of Robert Kugelmann from his Psychology and 
Catholicism: Contested Boundaries (Kugelmann, 2011). I have chosen this text as 
it seems to be the first comprehensive account of the history of the reception of 
psychology amongst Catholic psychologists, itself written by a psychologist. As 
well as its historical value, Kugelmann’s text is also constructive, and it is here 
that I will employ it. Integration, on this model, is one of four possible 
approaches to the place of psychology within religion, and itself must be guided 
by the criterion of dialogue, existential reflexivity, and symbolic mediation.6 
Concerning the four models of relationship, there are firstly approaches which 
argue for the separation of the two subjects; the second case employs a 
hierarchy in which psychology is ordered to the Catholic faith; third is the 
founding of a psychology upon theological language and concerns, using 
Scripture as data; and finally Kugelmann observes that psychology might 
function as a substitute for faith. The first and second categories are largely 
those studied by Kugelmann, who observes an historical shift from the first 
framework to one of recognising the “autonomous contribution of psychology to 
                                                          
6 See my conclusion for more detail. 
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understanding and changing human behaviour and minds” (Kugelmann, 2013: 
403). Notwithstanding the fact that it seems unclear how psychology being 
“bound to philosophy and theology” is consistent with autonomy in anything 
other than basic method, it is this category in which I will attempt to place 
Merton.  
 
Central to this task are the three criteria of dialogue, existential reflexivity, and 
symbolic mediation. Dialogue as utilised here involves the recognition of 
otherness, conversation, relationship: “assimilating the other’s position to one’s 
own world, and in journeying, becoming a stranger in a strange land” 
(Kugelmann, 2013:418). Reflexivity entails that “the integration must be 
grounded in one’s living”, such that it is a matter of personal desire and 
engagement (Kugelmann, 2013: 414). Finally, the candidate for integration must 
recognise that dialogue and commitment always take place mediated by the 
contingency of language, and so display “immersion in the symbolic order” 
(Kugelmann, 2013: 416). This exposes any putative positivist experience of pure 
facts transcending the mediation of symbolic forms as “the illusion of immediate 
grasp of the thing itself” (Kugelmann, 2013: 416), and so recognises the 
conditioned nature of human experience and culture. Using this framework, I 
will suggest that Merton is prima facie viable candidate for integration, but that 
ultimately certain theological imperatives in his work at least mitigate his 
adequacy.  
 
In order to discuss these limitations in more depth, I will draw on David Cooper’s 
Thomas Merton’s Art of Denial (Cooper, 2008). Here, Merton is seen as having 
undergone a major reorientation from the hostile ascetic to the radical 
humanist, as Cooper describes in his analyses of Merton’s self-image as a writer 
and his writings on art, humanism, and social questions. I will consider whether 
this narrative is visible in Merton’s psychological writings, and ultimately suggest 
that the historical dialectic perceived by Cooper actually endures to the end. 
This will anticipate the scrutiny of whether Merton is properly inclusive, as 
suggested by Ross Labrie’s Thomas Merton and the Inclusive Imagination (Labrie, 
12 
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2010), in which Merton is seen as longing for the unity of persons and of being. I 
will end by questioning whether this desire is fulfilled in the integration of 
psychology and religion in a dialogical, existential, and symbolic synthesis, or 
whether instead there remain fissures in his work evocative of the conflicts 
described by both Fromm and Horney. 
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Chapter One: The Neurotic Personality in the Monastic Life 
 
In the first paragraph of his posthumously published “The Neurotic Personality in 
the Monastic Life” (Merton, 1993), Thomas Merton makes two important 
distinctions which will inform the rest of his psychological writings. First, he 
observes – citing his experience – that there are many problems in the monastic 
life which are psychological in nature rather than primarily ascetic. Second, 
Merton distinguishes between those who are neurotic, being the subject of a 
serious neurosis, and those who merely suffer from neurotic anxiety. Here the 
distinction is made for the benefit of the monastic supervisors for whom Merton 
mainly writes, but will also provide an important indication of what he 
understands to be the scope of psychological issues and his writings upon them. 
This – along with the distinction between psychological and ascetic - is 
something that I will return to, but for now it suffices to note that Merton 
supposes psychological problems in the monastic life to be “many”, and 
identifies a phenomenon of neurotic anxiety distinct from serious neurosis 
(Merton, 1993: 5f).  
 
That Merton is writing in the context of his involvement in the spiritual and 
psychological formation of young monks immediately has important ramifications 
for the question of applying Robert Kugelmann’s criteria to Merton’s 
methodology. First, it is clear that this role has involved both genuine dialogue 
and existential commitment for Merton, as it can be seen from his reading notes 
and from accounts of the period in his journals that this was a period of deep 
learning and struggle (Waldron, 2011: 60ff). It is nonetheless questionable 
whether this is quite as fruitful for the criterion of symbol, given that his work in 
monastic formation and in this first paper has the particular purpose of training 
the monks in the traditions of Catholic ascetical theology. It is true that this 
qualifies as symbolic as specified by Kugelmann, but it is not clear that at this 
juncture Catholic spirituality is seen as a symbol system among others, as it 
14 
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would be in some of the later works we will study subsequently. Moreover this 
also has important ramifications for the notion of dialogue. Later works will also 
address the need for the young monk to develop in the direction proper to his 
true self rather than in accordance with an imposed school of spirituality, in this 
case the ascesis that Merton will later renounce.  The question to be borne in 
mind in this respect is whether Merton’s approach at this stage is more agenda-
laden than might qualify as proper dialogue and as immersion in a symbol system 
properly acknowledged as cultural. 
 
Merton then adds an outline of serious neuroses, stressing that persons suffering 
from them would not be suitable candidates for the religious life (Merton, 1993: 
5).7 This includes symptoms of hysteria, neurasthenia, paranoia, obsession, 
hypochondria, and schizophrenia. Here Merton also touches on the depressive 
character, who should not necessarily be excluded from the religious life but 
would find therein many occasions for suffering. Since these serious symptoms 
are not of particular import in either this paper or the writings which will be 
subsequently considered, I will merely note them here. This account, however, 
arguably exhibits a weakness in Merton’s account of the neurotic personality, 
namely his reticence in specifying sources for his often sweeping and vague 
claims. This is particularly true of his assertion that the suppression of hostility 
is at the root of the trouble typically experienced by the depressive character.8  
 
Merton continues these opening sections of “The Neurotic Personality…” with 
remarks that are a familiar theme in his writings generally, concerning mistaking 
immature and childish dependency on monastic superiors with the virtue of 
obedience.9 Here we can glimpse the later personalist and existentialist themes 
in Merton’s writing, and perhaps also the stress on self-realization that he will 
                                                          
7 Here religious life signifies the consecrated life of monks, nuns, or friars, characterised by community life 
and vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. 
8 Of course, the force of this objection is mitigated somewhat given that we are not dealing with an 
academic paper, and by the possibility that much of what Merton writes is based on his notes from the 
1956 conference referred to above.  
9 As an indication of the extent to which Merton’s psychological interest of this period penetrates his 
spiritual writings, see (Merton, 1955). 
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find in Karen Horney and Erich Fromm. Rather, however, than the mere human 
development of these authors, he is concerned with the possibility that 
emotional dependence on another person – characterized by Horney as either 
masochism (Horney, 1929) or self-effacement (Horney, 1950) and by Erich 
Fromm as symbiosis (Fromm, 2001 [1941]) - will inhibit the full development of 
grace in the soul (Merton, 1993: 6).  
 
This issue of the development of grace in the soul arguably reiterates the 
question over dialogue and the symbolic order relative to the ascetical 
imperative. Again we must question whether the stress on the particular 
spiritual discipline of ascetical theology can be reconciled with the type of 
dialogue espoused by Kugelmann and later that advocated by Merton. Secondly, 
we can also ask whether the use of a particular theological category of grace – 
notwithstanding Merton’s intended audience – is simply assumed as one which 
facilitates the development of selfhood and hence true dialogue. This is 
analogous to certain tensions between Merton and Erich Fromm around the 
question of God and human alienation which will be discussed in later chapters. 
Finally, the section concludes with a brief but important anticipation of Merton’s 
later treatment of guilt, since he stresses here that the neurotic – meaning 
serious neurosis – is not to be treated as guilty or reprehensible. This arguably 
implies something of the automatic nature of neurotic activity, a theme that we 
will return to in considering Merton and Bamberger’s “The Mature Conscience”. 
For now, however, we move on from the description of serious neurosis to the 
more general theme of ascesis and psychiatry. 
 
1.1: Psychiatry and Asceticism (Merton, 1993: 6ff) 
 
Merton begins to develop the theme of how neurotic anxiety – bearing in mind 
its distinction from serious neurosis – inhibits the development of the spiritual 
life. Anxiety is a central psychological theme in Merton’s writings, and later in 
this chapter we will consider its importance and range, as well as the 
16 
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consistency of its use. Whilst also noting here his connection between increasing 
anxiety and the quest for perfection, we must first see how Merton develops the 
distinction noted above between psychiatry and ascesis.11  
 
Merton stresses first the essentially ascetical nature of the religious life, since 
its spiritual exercises are intended as training towards “a life of perfection in 
Christ” (Merton, 1993: 6). Since these points perhaps assume some knowledge of 
the nature of asceticism, it is worth pointing out that it is traditionally 
understood to be primarily a matter of discipline in self-denial, by which one is 
prepared for the life of grace in the soul. Merton stresses elsewhere that he 
understands ascetical and spiritual/mystical theology to be a unity comprising 
the initial work of self-denial and the subsequent stage in which the dwelling of 
Christ in the soul is developed and perfected (Merton, 2008: 15-21). That this 
privileges a particular notion of perfection is clear, and again raises questions 
with respect to Merton’s interpretation of the nature of the Christian symbol 
system, and the purpose of true dialogue. Having established the nature of 
asceticism, we can now consider the further distinction made between 
asceticism and psychiatry.  
 
It is important to note at the outset that here we are dealing with a distinction, 
rather than a separation or opposition. Indeed this is central to the whole 
possibility of assessing the place of psychological themes in Merton’s thought 
under the paradigm of integration, since Merton works and writes with the 
underlying belief that psychiatry and asceticism aim at essentially the same 
thing, and address the same problem: human perfection, and inordinate self-
                                                          
11 Merton refers here not to the perfecting impulse in itself, but rather when it is sought or enjoined in 
inappropriate ways. This observation was subsequently echoed by Adrian Van Kaam and Carl Rogers, 
contrasting those who merely mimic the perfection or way of life impressed on them by others, and those 
who develop according to their own nature. (Van Kaam, 1966: 69, 77), and (Rogers, 1980: 5-26). Van Kaam 
observes – from his professional counselling experience – a tendency in spiritual aspirants to mimic exterior 
standards found in the lives of saints or theological manuals. In a manner resembling Merton’s theory of 
selfhood, he contrasts this with the interior discovery of the truth of one’s own being emerging 
spontaneously from within. Van Kaam’s account of the contrast between genuine existential and dialectical 
willing and mere wilfulness is also of relevance to Merton’s account of self-will. Rogers, from a secular 
perspective, describes how he consistently witnesses new life in people when they are simply attended to 
without an agenda. 
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love, respectively. Ascesis is said to be the means of enabling one to “grow in his 
supernatural and spiritual likeness to Christ [and develop his] personality in view 
of his supernatural end.” This involves elevation above the flesh, the world, the 
“old man”, and divine union through Christ, and its main methods are self-
denial, prayer, and love, based on the New Testament and “Catholic tradition as 
a whole” (Merton, 1993: 7).12 
 
Psychiatry, on the other hand, aims at the “normal, natural maturity of the 
human soul”, specifically souls in need of liberation from “emotional and mental 
dysfunctions, resulting from traumatic experiences of the past, and from the 
wrong attitudes and bad mental habits resulting from these experiences” 
(Merton, 1993: 7). Here psychiatry involves the quest to be free from 
dependence on the immature and erroneous attitudes characteristic of 
psychological dysfunctions, which the person is unable to dispel despite being 
aware of how they are warping his/her life. Of crucial importance for Merton’s 
psychological emphases is the claim that ascetical methods are powerless to 
assist with problems of a neurotic nature. This claim is deeply significant, since 
it amounts to this: if spirituality is a matter of human growth on a supernatural 
level, and if there are natural psychological dysfunctions which inhibit this 
growth, then in such cases psychiatry will be a necessary preliminary to 
ascetical and mystical life. It is also important to note here the implications of 
this for considering the reflexivity of Merton’s work, particularly in light of his 
search for neurosis in his own life. Moreover it is generally testament to the 
integrative flavour of his approach that he is keen to appropriate the findings of 
other sciences into Christian theology.  
 
Indeed, Merton asserts that ascetical theory and practice assume the normal 
functioning of a mature soul, for instance in the emotional realm, wherein 
repressed emotional energy can otherwise masquerade as ascetic zeal. Here we 
encounter Merton’s hierarchical approach to the unity of psychiatry and 
                                                          
12 See (Labrie, 2010) for a discussion of Merton’s particular interpretation of asceticism. 
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ascetical – and subsequently spiritual/mystical – theology, and the unity of the 
nature and grace in the human soul. The ultimate aim of spiritual life – here 
union with God in Christ – presupposes a healthy soul which can be raised to 
sanctity and spiritual union. Psychiatry may then operate with a subsidiary aim, 
making healthy and mature persons of previously sick ones (Merton, 1993: 7). 
Quite simply, for an immature or imbalanced person, there is no possibility of 
spiritual development, since the activity of that person is fundamentally 
misguided and corrupted by immature tendencies.13 
 
It is here, in a dense and not altogether measured paragraph, that Merton begins 
to reflect in some depth on the extent of the impediments to spiritual living 
which – in his view - psychiatry addresses (Merton, 1993: 7-8). In order to 
emphasise the breadth of the claims made in this single paragraph, I have 
chosen to list them by number and without comment: 
1. The neurotic suffers from infantile emotional reactions, judgements, 
and desires. 
2. He cannot practice asceticism because he “does not know what he is 
doing”. 
3. Supposed spiritual attractions and inspirations may be merely the 
emergence of pent-up emotion, such that the subject is moved not by 
God but by subconscious anxiety. 
4. The desire for prayer, God, and asceticism is really the displaced 
desire for a mature normal existence. This is thwarted by the 
attachment to immature attitudes and beliefs. 
5. Ascetic intentions are consequently an escape from reality rather than 
adaptation to it. 
6. Even if he indulges his desires, he remains restless and tormented. 
7. He either resists authority or complies without interior understanding 
and assent. 
                                                          
13 Here one might approach the matter of the privileged place of self-denial and grace in human perfection 
from another angle. Merton assumes that only one who conforms to psychiatric standards of health can be 
a candidate for sanctity, a claim that would later be rendered highly suspect by developments in psychiatric 
thinking by R.D. Laing (1967) and Stanislav Grof (2000), among others.  
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8. He lives in fantasy and illusion, and hence is not at peace with reality. 
 
Despite its range, the paragraph contains a brief summary of themes which 
will reoccur in the first two chapters of this thesis.14 The neurotic suffers from 
various infantile traits which can be mistaken for inspiration and spiritual 
desires, and which function as an escape from reality and result in restlessness. 
All of these issues can be exacerbated when the pressure of anxiety and the 
difficulties of the ascetical life prompt the person to turn to a director who 
diagnoses them as symptoms of imagination and self-love, and prescribes the 
solution of mere will-power. This stress on willing elicits a crucial observation, 
and indeed one of the points where we can see most clearly Merton’s method of 
dialogue and integration, as well as his willingness to subject traditional Catholic 
attitudes to the microscope of new thinking. Merton challenges the stress in 
traditional spiritual writings on the exercise of the will by pointing out that in 
the neurotic – serious or otherwise – it is precisely the power of the will that is 
inhibited and sick.  
 
In order to understand what Merton means by sickness of the will we can recall 
the citation above in which he describes how psychiatry aims at liberation first 
from dysfunction in emotion or intellect, and also from attachment to and 
dependency on erroneous mental habits. Due to these consequences of 
traumatic experience the will is hindered, the judgement darkened, and the 
whole person subject to the power of repressed emotion interfering with 
conscious activity. Hence, in something of a vicious circle, the neurotic may 
experience his inability to respond to his ascetic formation by will power, and 
slip further into torment by being prescribed more willing as a remedy.  
 
Psychiatry, then, deals with a problem preliminary to the ultimate quest of 
spiritual perfection: the development of emotional and mental maturity through 
                                                          
14 See note 55 for comments on gender-specific language. 
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the treatment of immature patterns of behaviour and thought. The immediate 
question which arises in my view concerns the nature of this immaturity, and 
hence maturity. As we have seen, the concept of maturity is a familiar refrain in 
the opening stages of Merton’s paper, but it is not directly defined. The closest 
we come to this is in the connection between a mature human soul and ordinary 
emotional problems. Here Merton writes that if the ordinary emotional problems 
of life remain unresolved there results the repression of the “emotional energy 
excited by these problems”, which makes asceticism perilous. So, we can see 
that emotional immaturity prohibits the solution of ordinary problems and 
results in the failure to discharge emotional energy, but we might legitimately 
wonder what these ordinary emotional problems consist of.15 Moreover, this 
description places the release of emotional energy at the centre of human 
maturity, which we might suggest is influenced by Merton’s reading of Freud. In 
themselves, the merits of such an account would require separate scientific 
treatment, but instead I would like to raise – and attempt to answer - the 
question of whether this is consistent with Merton’s approach to anxiety. 
 
1.2a: Anxiety (Merton, 1993: 9-14) 
 
Given that Merton places anxiety at the “center of all psychological problems” 
(Merton, 1993: 9), we can suppose that his account of it will be central to his 
writings on psychology. Moreover, because of the arguable interdependence 
between psychology and spirituality, anxiety will also be of great importance to 
the spiritual life.  Merton begins this section of his paper with what seems like a 
Freudian definition: “Anxiety is the psychological tension produced by 
undischarged emotional energy…which remains pent up beyond the point at 
which it should normally and naturally be discharged” (Merton, 1993: 9).16 
                                                          
15 Indeed an analysis of (Merton, unpublished) will shed light on this issue. 
16 In fact, the definition resembles the early Freud, where anxiety is caused by repression. Freud later 
sought to probe deeper into the causes of repression itself, concluding that anxiety was prior in the form of 
the threats to security posed by the Über-Ich. For an account of this transition, see (Kahn, 2002: 105-114), 
and (Gay, 1988: 484-488). Indeed, as my account of anxiety in (Merton, 1993) will soon show, Merton also 
attempts to account for the question of the origin of anxiety with recourse to security in our social and 
existential situation. 
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Merton then continues with the distinction between felt/conscious and 
unconscious anxiety. The former is an indistinct feeling of indecision or 
helplessness relative to some actual or imagined danger. This carries with it a 
“general sense of fear, foreboding, hesitation, and doubt”, as well as physical 
symptoms such as thirst, perspiration, trembling, or nervousness (Merton, 1993: 
9). 
 
As well as this felt variety, there can be unfelt anxiety manifest in more serious 
physical symptoms, or in projection. In the latter, the sufferer unconsciously 
finds cause for distress in their surroundings, in resentment, suspicion, and 
general discontent with the prevailing order. This provides ostensible protection 
from the painful process of acknowledging anxiety, which Merton says – without 
a classification – will also involve the construction of defence mechanisms. 
Should, however, these defences begin to disintegrate, the subject will be 
exposed to the forces they have attempted to repress, and hence plunged into 
panic. This does not entail the discharge of the energy, since the mind is unable 
to identify its real object.  
 
Merton, continuing to assume that anxiety is indeed the result of repressed 
emotion, then begins to consider various attempts to identify the particular 
emotion which is at the root of the trouble. Whilst rejecting any approach 
centred exclusively on sexual energy, Merton nonetheless acknowledges that 
repressed and immature sexual energy, “lies at the basis of much nervous and 
mental trouble in religion” (Merton, 1993: 10).17 Should sexual energies not find 
acceptance, integration, and expression, either through sexual activity or 
cultural sublimation, one's offering to God will not be complete, and life will be 
strewn with trouble. Again it is important to note the manner in which 
psychology is envisaged as ordered to a complete offering of self to God, since it 
is another instance of the ascetical hierarchy employed in Merton’s treatment of 
psychological themes. 
                                                          
17 Again, Merton refers to the consecrated life of Catholic religious communities.  
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Having offered this somewhat synthetic – notwithstanding the ascetical hierarchy 
- approach to the claims of Freudian psychoanalysis, Merton turns to what has 
elsewhere been called the Neo-Freudian turn (e.g. Rycroft, 1972: 60). Here, in 
Merton’s view, there are specifically human emotions which we might call 
relational or social, which when repressed are the source of anxiety and hence 
immaturity and neurosis. Merton describes these primarily in terms of fearing 
isolation, exclusion, or the loss or respect, or inadequacy around measuring up 
to the standards of a productive society. Alternatively, the subject may fear the 
discovery of their repressed hostility and the loss of respect and love that this 
might entail. In Merton’s estimation, then, the emotions at work are primary 
around our sense of personal worth, maintaining membership of society, and 
harmony with others. It is important to remember, perhaps in contrast with 
Horney, that Merton remains committed to the view that it is the repression of 
these emotions that produces anxiety, rather than the emotions themselves.  
 
Merton then draws a parallel between Erich Fromm’s account of the psychology 
of the flight into totalitarian pseudo-solidarity, and an analogous phenomenon 
wherein one takes refuge from reality in religious life (Merton, 1993: 11). Here 
the solution to anxiety is found in conforming to the community, which becomes 
the main barometer of personal value and a shelter from the responsibility of 
engaged living. This analysis will have a later parallel in Merton’s analysis of the 
value of existentialism and individual freedom in theology (Merton, 2013), but 
for now the most important point is that disquiet felt in the face of change is 
symptomatic of an underlying counterfeit peace. That this peace is found in 
conformity demonstrates that the person does not make a pure offering of self 
to God, but merely conforms to the status quo in order to allay anxiety. 
 
Merton now begins to challenge the – somewhat anonymous – idea that the 
solution to anxiety is adjustment to society. This has also been seen by Karen 
Horney, Erich Fromm, and others as the corruption of psychoanalysis, in its being 
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placed at the service of mere social conformity and cohesion. Instead, given 
Merton’s theological world-view and anthropology, to adjust to a disordered – 
“deranged” (Merton, 1993: 12) - society is actually maladjustment, and a flight 
from reality. Instead, in such times of disorder, one might be expected to feel 
anxiety, and indeed should see it as a means to spiritual discovery and 
development. If, that is, we live in an unsatisfactory social order, then we 
should find that the pangs of discontent lead us on a search for what is real, and 
ultimately to sanctity. Here, however, we might also raise the issue of 
adjustment in the writings of Merton, relative to the question repeatedly posed 
about prejudiced notions of ascesis, human perfection, grace, etc. 
Notwithstanding the stress on genuine human freedom in Merton’s work, the 
hierarchical approach to psychology and theology invites the question as to 
whether this is not simply adjustment with a different end, with a spiritual 
adjustment with particular theological presuppositions replacing social 
adjustment. 
 
In any case, the main point is that anxiety is not something which is merely to be 
escaped or discharged, but to be faced. Anxiety on this view is a symptom of a 
deeper malaise, cured by conformity to reality rather than the structures of 
mass society. Having critiqued the solution of adjustment, Merton considers a 
theme which will reappear in the later essay on existentialism: the 
rationalization of anxiety (Merton, 2013). Here the connection is made between 
anxiety and the experience of evil, sin and separation from God. Any philosophy, 
that is, which makes anxiety a basic and unavoidable component of human 
existential reality may ignore the fact that that anxiety springing from 
separation from God is something to be met not with mere resignation but with 
a life ordered to divine union.  On this view, anxiety has an antidote in the 
spiritual life. 
 
Merton concludes his enumeration of some factors engendering anxiety by 
turning to the purification of faith described in various Christian mystical texts, 
in which one experiences the anguish of recognising the gulf between self and 
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God.18 Again, for Merton, this type of anxiety is to be distinguished from those 
produced by repressed emotion, since it is an indication of a growing immersion 
of the soul in the reality of its condition. That said, Merton again demonstrates 
the extent to which his understanding of traditional texts is informed by more 
recent thought, in claiming that such purifications might well involve the 
shedding of traces of the infantile.19 Furthermore, Merton suggests that there 
can be confused diagnoses at work here, given that an uninformed director 
might assume that the anxiety of the neurotic struggle is instead that of mystical 
purification. Of course, as we have seen, such a diagnosis would fail to see that 
the treatment of neurotic disorders is prior to the ascetical and mystical life 
rather than part of its summit. 
 
At this point we might begin to question the coherence of Merton’s 
understanding(s) of anxiety, particularly given this last discussion of moral and 
spiritual roots. Given the initial definition of anxiety as undischarged emotion, is 
there some tension with the subsequent emphasis on discord with reality? It is 
possible to argue that Merton has simply juxtaposed the Freudian account 
alongside the social and the mystical, and failed to recognise the possibility of 
tension. Alternatively, we might also argue that each of these is presented as a 
different species of the same phenomenon of repressed emotion, such that 
Merton’s approach accounts for the complexity and mystery of the matter as 
well as for the diversity of necessarily provisional psychoanalytic answers to the 
question. In this case we would have to account for the final instance, in which 
anxiety is seen as a symptom of separation from God, since here it is not clear 
where repression is at work.  
 
In general, however, there is the possibility of reading Merton as using a 
phenomenological methodology, based on both his own experience and his 
reading. Here Merton’s intent would simply be to communicate to his monastic 
                                                          
18 On the anguish of the beginnings of the contemplative life, see (Merton, 1967: 117f). 
19 We might also ask if the focus on the infantile is informed by reflexivity and Merton’s experience of self 
throughout his existential struggles. The question of Merton’s childhood is not an issue in this paper, but 
has been considered in depth in (Gardner, 2015), and (Waldron, 2011). 
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peers something of the depth and seriousness of the problem of anxiety and the 
importance of psychoanalysis, in the hope that this will resonate with their own 
experience and needs in spiritual direction. Finally, Merton has arguably simply 
displayed his characteristic breadth in approaching a problem, and perhaps 
recognised from his own experience that anxiety may have a number of 
emotional roots over different periods of a person’s life. 
 
Returning to the text, we can now focus on Merton’s description of the various 
characteristics of the anxiety experienced by the neurotic. First, given the 
earlier assertion that “[a]nxiety is universal”, a further distinction is in order, 
between normal and neurotic anxiety. The normal type, experienced at some 
point by all, normally has a “more or less rational cause” (Merton, 1993: 13). 
The first characteristic of the neurotic variety of anxiety, however, is that it can 
be stimulated by innocuous events, and hence is experienced in an entirely 
disproportionate and more or less ubiquitous fashion. This is a reflection of the 
fact that “the neurotic is to some extent out of touch with reality” (Merton, 
1993: 13), a theme which recurs often in Merton’s writings, but must remain 
peripheral in my account here. 
 
Secondly, neurosis increasingly leads to character disintegration. Once more 
involving a discrepancy between subject and reality, this means that the 
neurotic becomes compulsively or obsessively engaged with irrelevant tasks. 
Merton here includes such general behaviour as counting steps or checking that 
lights have been switched off, but also such putatively religious phenomena as a 
compulsive urge to touch a statue. The third characteristic again involves a 
flight from reality, in that the life of avoidance of neurotic anxiety always 
manifests some artificiality. This concerns the need to fabricate justifications, 
denials, or rationalizations for one’s behaviour, a phenomena well known in 
psychoanalytic literature from Freud onwards.20  Of course, this is associated 
                                                          
20 See (Cordón, 2012: 83), (Fromm, 1950: 57ff), and (Horney, 1939: 29-30). 
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with the false self which is a staple of later Merton texts, and which is our final 
characteristic of neurotic anxiety. 
 
1.2b: The False Self in Karen Horney 
 
Before considering the false self in “The Neurotic Personality in the Monastic 
Life”, a brief elaboration of Karen Horney’s account of the neurotic personality 
and false-self system will enable me to draw both parallels with and distinctions 
from Merton’s understanding. As we have seen above, Horney’s importance to 
Merton is confirmed in his description of a second period of his monastic life 
during which he “began reading psychoanalysis” among other things. Of all the 
psychoanalysts Merton read, he names here only Horney and Fromm, and, given 
that this letter was written merely a year before his death, we can appreciate 
the enduring importance of Horney in his incorporation of psychoanalysis into his 
world-view (Merton, 2009: 11).21 In her Neurosis and Human Growth, Horney 
explains the formation of a false-self system as a response to insecurity and 
isolation in a hostile world. To cope with these – in Horney’s view a consequence 
of inadequate nurture22 - the neurotic constructs an idealised self in order to 
pursue glory and security, and as a safety device to prevent the basic anxiety 
from emerging into awareness (Horney, 1950: 17-39). As a result of this, the 
person labours under “the tyranny of the should”, self-imposed standards of 
excellence which are believed to be necessary for security and affirmation 
(Horney, 1950: 64-85). Any challenge to these standards (e.g. from insult or from 
an impossible task or expectation) results in the threat of the collapse of the 
false-self system and the resultant deluge of the repressed insecurity and 
consequent anxiety. 
 
                                                          
21 As well as it being clear from his journals and autobiography that he had read Freud and Jung, Merton’s 
reading journals of 1955-56 also include several pages of notes on each of Otto Fenichel, Agostino Gemelli, 
Samuel Kraines, and Joseph Nuttin (Merton, 1956).  
22 This is contrasted to the work of Erich Fromm, for whom insecurity is – as we shall see in chapter three – 
a basic existential characteristic of human life and consequence of evolution beyond mere instinct. 
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In addition to an immediate consideration of Merton’s treatment of the 
false-self in “The Neurotic Personality…”, two points are of relevance to this 
thesis. Firstly, given the importance of alienation in later chapters, it is 
significant that for Horney the ideal self results in the subject being alienated 
from the genuine self (Horney, 1950: 177). Hence Horney envisages 
psychoanalysis as a process of uprooting both the idealised self and the original 
insecurity at its root, and allowing the genuine self to emerge. Secondly, in 
Horney’s view the failure of the genuine self to measure up to the imposed 
standards results in self-contempt and guilt, and the deepening of the rejection 
of the genuine self and entrenchment of the ideal. This second point leads us to 
Horney’s notion of inner conflict, which is ultimately of great relevance in 
considering David Cooper’s account of Merton’s development.  
 
As the title suggests, Horney argues that idealised self-structures in one 
individual can be several, such that there is conflict not only between the ideal 
self and the real self, but between distinct ideal selves (Horney, 1945). This 
might involve, for example, a conflict between the self-perception of being a 
great success in business and that of being present to one’s family. Merton 
himself acknowledges an enduring struggle between the contemplative and 
artistic aspects of his personality (Cooper, 2008), and describes his struggles 
with assumed ideals of sanctity (Merton, 1995: 133; 1996b: 121, 134, 154, 170, 
230; 1996 184, 214, 303; 1996c: 85, 87; 1998: 124). Whilst it would be 
presumptuous to apply categories of truth and falsehood to these, I can and will 
ask whether such conflict remains in his approach to psychology until the end. 
Regarding the emergence of the genuine self, we shall also see something 
analogous in the psychological analysis of Merton’s later Introduction to 
Christian Mysticism, where he encourages spiritual directors to focus on allowing 
rejected aspects of the personality to be recovered. Having made this brief 
summary of the work of Horney and its relevance, I will now consider the place 
of the idealised self in his paper on neurosis. 
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1.3: The Ideal Self (Merton, 1993: 14) 
 
Here, Merton stresses the construction of an idealized image of self, within 
which the symptoms of the neurotic behaviour are located and hence made to 
seem reasonable. Merton does not give examples here, but we might consider 
the case of someone who works in an obsessive and compulsive manner, based 
on the justification/rationalization that they are the only one capable of doing 
the job.  Merton distinguishes between the type of idealized image which is 
exalted and “mythomanic”, and – the sense intended here – one which is merely 
unreal (and not necessarily superior) (Merton, 1993: 14).  Secondly, in an 
account which is more reminiscent of Carl Rogers “self-concept” than Horney’s 
idealized image, Merton suggests that the self-image might have a negative 
component which produces guilt feelings when measured against the excellence 
that the neurotic desires. Merton follows Horney here in introducing the idea 
that persons with neuroses labour under the impression that they ought 
(Horney’s “should”) to be able to make their peers recognise their excellence, 
and suffer under the ensuing guilt from the inability to do so. Merton differs, 
however, from Horney’s account by supposing that both the guilt and the 
excellence are components of the idealised image. Finally, Merton suggest that 
the “guilt becomes a means of continuing to suppose that this excellence exists” 
(Merton, 1993: 14), which arguably differs from Horney’s observation that the 
guilt (or self-contempt) arises from the failure to achieve the imagined 
excellence.  
 
Despite these relatively minor differences, Merton shares Horney’s basic thesis: 
that anxiety – in Merton’s view the result of one of several possibilities of 
repressed emotion, whilst for Horney rooted in insecurity – results in the 
creation of an artificial self-image to which a person feels bound to live up to, 
and from which neurotic behaviour follows. This false self would later become 
characteristic of Merton’s spiritual writings generally, in works such as New 
Seeds of Contemplation, and The New Man. To consider this in the requisite 
depth would require a dedicated paper, but in the remainder of this chapter we 
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shall witness the role that Merton ascribes to spiritual direction in response to 
this, beginning with the resultant problem of self-will.23 
 
1.4: Self-Will (Merton, 1993: 14) 
 
Merton begins this section by continuing to reflect on the idealized image, here 
with regard to whether the mature mind also operates with a distorted image of 
self. Answering in the affirmative, Merton claims that we should not presume to 
know ourselves “with absolute precision” since such would be rare and everyone 
has a tendency to exaggerate some quality or other (Merton, 1993: 14). The 
distinction between healthy and unhealthy, in this context, is that health entails 
being able both to appraise oneself more or less in accord with reality and to 
interact sanely with one’s society. The unhealthy mind, by contrast, has an 
idealised image of self which is immature, as we shall now see.  
 
In a passage which seems closely linked to his understanding of childhood in 
“The Mature Conscience”, as well as some reading notes on Horney’s theory of 
narcissism (Merton, 1956), Merton expounds the relationship between immature 
self-imaging and immature willing. The infant and the neurotic both envisage 
the world merely in terms of their own needs, viewing events and people 
through the prism of self. Central here in connection with the neurotic is the 
feeling of omnipotence, wherein the neurotic believes that their needs and 
desires are such that the environment should necessarily respond. Whilst this is 
the natural condition of infancy, in the neurotic it endures as an inner – often 
                                                          
23 The issue of selfhood in Merton’s work has been considered in depth in (Carr, 1988), (Finley, 1978), and 
(Shannon, 1981). This matter is beyond my remit here simply because of its range and centrality in Merton’s 
later works. In my view, however, none of these texts sufficiently acknowledge the possibility that Merton’s 
encounter with Horney – and Fromm – could have been decisive in the later centrality of false/true 
selfhood in his work. This question is complicated by references to selfhood in medieval Catholic writers in 
Merton’s journals before his reading of Horney, and given the diversity of his sources will likely remain 
mysterious. It is also of great interest that Merton compares his notion of the exterior self that impedes 
contemplation with Freud’s Über-Ich, in The Inner Experience. Both are seen as infantile, introjected, 
inauthentic pseudo-consciences which are at once conscious and buried deep in the unconscious, and 
which are hence very difficult to shift (Merton, 2003:25).  
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unacknowledged – state born of a perceived helplessness. It is worth pointing out 
here that for the first time in his paper Merton hints at helplessness as the origin 
of immature adult attitudes. In the meantime, though, the most important point 
is that this (unconscious) feeling of helplessness leads to discord between the 
inner world and the outer world, which the neurotic sees not in itself but 
relative to their own childish needs.  
 
Next, the paper begins to draw in what seems like a more explicit fashion on 
Horney, in its consideration of what the neurotic in their self-idealisation 
expects from the world.24 Such is the need to mask this deep helplessness that 
the neurotic might adapt a variety of poises towards the world to remain secure: 
the demand for exclusive love and attention from all, based on an idea of 
deservedness, or the illusion of ease, greatness, or strength in any area. Here, 
again anticipating the later work of Van Kaam, Merton makes what I consider to 
be one of his most significant spiritual points, concerning a perceived need to 
live up to ideal standards of sanctity, in prayer, fasting, miraculous powers. This 
unconscious framework, and the impossibility of achieving it, becomes the 
occasion of the projection of anger and self-judgement onto the environment, a 
vain attempt to stop the edifice of sanctity collapsing under self-reproach. Since 
Merton suggests that failure to achieve such standards is a source of anxiety, we 
might ask whether he confuses the means of defence against anxiety with its 
source, or whether the source is to be understood in an intermediate sense as 
the origin of the anxiety coming to awareness rather than the anxiety per se. 
Arguably the latter option is more attractive, since it is clear from the rest of 
the paper that Merton understands the emotional repression that results in 
anxiety to be prior to the formation or failure of the unconscious framework. 
 
Nonetheless, what follows is perhaps the most penetrating of all the analyses in 
this first of Merton’s psychological papers, concerning self-will. With what seems 
to be a direct analogy between, firstly, the relationship between self-will and 
                                                          
24 On the claims upon the environment that become part of the neurotic self-image see (Horney, 1950: 40-
63). 
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sin in the spiritual realm, and secondly, wilfulness and neurosis in psychology, 
Merton roots the tenacity of the neurotic illusion squarely in the persistence of 
self-will. By self-will, the neurotic “clings in desperation to his idealized image 
of himself” (Merton, 1993: 16), fighting against God and his peers to uphold his 
desires, and avoiding acknowledgement of the idealised image. This self-will 
enables the repression of anxiety and the truth about oneself, but at the cost of 
producing the emotional tension born of the real nature crying out against its 
suffocation. Here, argues Merton, is “the cause of most of the nervous tension in 
the monastic life” (Merton, 1993: 16).25 
 
Again Merton targets any attitude which supposes that the solution to spiritual or 
moral problems is the strengthening of the will.26 On Merton’s reading, the 
traditional answer to neurotic (notwithstanding the ostensible anachronism) 
difficulties involves a vicious circle: the sufferers are told to use the will to 
liberate themselves, when it is the will that is the guardian of their own self-
deception. The will is the means used for defence against helplessness and 
anxiety by perpetuating the actions designed to confirm the idealised image. 
Hence, the will is so compromised that further recourse to it is futile. Indeed, 
rather than a will onerously strong, the difficulty is that it is too weak. In the 
quest to escape from helplessness, the neurotic fashions and subjects the will to 
the illusion of omnipotence. The will is then henceforth impotent as a force for 
genuine spontaneous activity.27 
 
Merton then distinguishes between the mature will, which sins knowingly, and 
the immature, which errs unknowingly in order to evade responsibility under the 
burden of its unconscious emotional distress. Merton again locates the origin of 
this unconscious activity in the neurotic desire to remain infantile, to have needs 
met without effort or responsibility, and merely to act on emotion and desire 
                                                          
25 It is arguably redolent with implications for any dialogue between moral theology and psychoanalysis, 
that Merton considers the willing at work here to be largely involuntary (i.e. not willing at all). 
26 The fifth chapter of Kugelmann’s seemingly comprehensive account of Catholic attitudes to psychology 
until the Second Vatican Council is devoted to this topic (Kugelmann, 2011: 165-202). 
27 Merton here is indebted to Otto Rank, once a member of the Freudian inner-circle (Gay, 1988: 472-483). 
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without the complication of judging and willing (Merton, 1993: 17). Finally, 
ostensibly fatal to the idea that what is being considered here is self-will, 
Merton adds that the actions of the neurotic are designed to secure something 
from the world around it (e.g. approval, attention, love, etc.), and as such 
cannot be attributed to will but to compulsive desire. 
 
As a remedy to this, Merton suggests a somewhat confusing mixture of the 
psychoanalytic theories of Rank – or perhaps later existentialist therapy - and 
Horney.28 In the first place, the task of the director – who in this case is not a 
psychoanalyst – is to develop the will of the subject, rather than shatter it 
through reproach and humiliation. Secondly, here echoing Horney, the director 
can develop an insight into the variety of neurotic character structures, in the 
hope of being able to demonstrate to the neurotic something of his self-illusion. 
The purpose of this approach, in which Merton seems to flirt with recommending 
that the director assumes the analytic mantle, is that the neurotic might 
recognise something of their own suffering and the futility of self-idealization. 
Hence what is sought is ultimately responsibility, or genuine willing in freedom 
and not compulsion.  
 
1.5: Transference (Merton, 1993: 18-19) 
 
Merton closes this paper by again demonstrating his sensitivity to the need to 
incorporate the genuine discoveries of secular thought into a Christian world-
view, in considering the phenomenon of transference. In this case, the 
imputation by the client/patient of the characteristics encountered in early-life 
experience to the psychoanalyst finds an analogy in the relationship between 
monk and spiritual director. The director becomes the object of subconscious 
desires, fears, and emotional drives, with the subject seeing in the director 
some of the central figures of his formative years. This process, in Merton’s eyes 
                                                          
28 Indeed the influence of Rank in this section suggests something of an incoherence between the stress on 
development of will and the disavowal of will-power in the foregoing.  
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a major hindrance to grace, involves the living out of one’s past in present 
relationships, and the re-experience of suppressed fears, suspicions, and 
frustrations. Furthermore, Merton says that the process can also be experienced 
in reverse, this time involving the repressed difficulties of the director being 
imputed to the monk! 
 
Again, Merton manifests what has been called his “inclusive imagination” 
(Labrie, 2001), since he not only incorporates the phenomenon of transference 
into his understanding of monastic relationships but also pleads that 
understanding of this be a vehicle of compassion for the one afflicted by 
neurosis.29 And finally, a most important point which merits future attention: 
seemingly raised as an aside to the concept of spiritual fatherhood in the 
monastery, Merton observes – reminiscent of Ludwig Feuerbach – that since “[a]ll 
fatherhood is from God…human beings instinctively tend to act towards God as 
they act towards their human father. They create for themselves a God made in 
the image of the father they know on earth” (Merton, 1993: 19).30 The point is 
made here in the context of the possibility that the image of God be remodelled 
based on the person of his director, but arguably has major resonance for a 
Catholic approach to psychoanalysis generally.  
 
1.6 Summary and Comments 
 
Merton’s approach to the question of neurosis is based on his experience of the 
prevalence of psychological problems in the monastery, and the structure of his 
paper is based on his distinction between psychology and ascesis. Psychology is 
concerned with the normal maturity of the person, and is seen as an increasingly 
                                                          
29 Two points here are dubious: (i) that the monks of previous ages had an intuitive knowledge of the 
personality traits discussed in this paper, especially questionable given the treatment of self-will in the 
foregoing; (ii) that the director refrain from practising psychoanalysis when not qualified, a point not 
dubious per se but in tension with the solutions to self-will also made in the previous section.  
30 Again this might point to the reflexive aspect of Merton’s work, relative to the rather erratic presence in 
his life of his own father. This has been discussed in depth throughout (Gardner, 2015) and (Waldron, 
2011), and in (Cooper, 2008: 69-95). 
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necessary prerequisite to the practice of ascesis and spirituality. Given that 
ascetical and spiritual practice are aimed at the life of self-denial, grace, and 
perfection in Christ, they assume the normal development of the soul. Hence 
Merton sees psychology and spirituality as in one sense interdependent, yet also 
hierarchically orders the former to the latter. I have pointed to a question mark 
over the nature of ascesis in the light of later developments in Merton’s thought 
and also relative to the question of Robert Kugelmann’s integrative criteria of 
cultural symbolism and dialogue. Firstly, ascesis is founded on self-denial, and 
the conquering of the old man, the flesh, and the world, which is arguably in 
tension with some of the humanist elements in later chapters. Secondly, 
arguably contrary to Kugelmann’s stress on the enculturated nature of symbols, 
Catholic ascetical theology is envisaged here to be the ultimate end of 
psychology, seemingly oblivious to the former being a particular spiritual system 
rooted in a specific time, place, vocabulary, theology, and anthropology. 
Thirdly, given that this system is a prerequisite of Merton’s dealings with his 
charges at this time, we might also ask what the implications are for real 
dialogue, especially given later developments towards the flourishing and 
acceptance of one’s genuine self and natural gifts.  
 
Nonetheless, despite not supposing any tension between the maturity of the soul 
and the subsequent conquering of its natural tendencies, Merton does argue that 
psychology aims at normal maturity.  The impediments to this natural maturity 
are the infantile traits which lead to illusion, the confusion of emotion turmoil 
with spiritual inspiration, and the ensuing restlessness. For Merton all of this 
amounts to a sickness of the will, which is hindered by interference from 
repressed emotion. These emotions – sexual, social, existential, or spiritual - 
also produce anxiety (either felt or unfelt), which is characterised by 
disproportionate reactions to mundane situations and the disintegration of 
character and self. Merton’s false self emerges (at least here) from the need to 
flee emotional distress, and tends to put the will at the service of its projects, 
meaning that it is very difficult to engage the will in the process of change. In 
Merton’s view the spiritual director should be able to identify the various 
neurotic character structures and communicate something of them to his 
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charges, but arguably Merton is rather vague when it comes to how this can be 
done in view of the binding of the will to the idealised self.31 Given that this is 
ultimately a question of free will, it is apt that we now turn to a second paper 
concerned with the relationship between freedom and maturity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 In Chapter Two I will consider how Merton’s Introduction to Christian Mysticism addresses the place of 
counselling in the spiritual life, which should clarify the role of the spiritual director. 
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Chapter Two: “The Mature Conscience”, and Introduction to 
Christian Mysticism 
 
2.1 “The Mature Conscience” (Merton & Bamberger, unpublished) 
 
Having seen that there is a certain lack of clarity in Merton’s references to 
maturity and immaturity, we can now turn to his paper “The Mature Conscience” 
in search of a remedy. In this paper, Merton and John Eudes Bamberger address 
in more depth the manner in which emotional immaturity hinders spiritual 
development. In the discussion of his analysis of self-well above, we have seen 
that Merton concludes by referring to freedom as the purpose of the attempt to 
help those suffering under neurosis.  Here the authors consider in greater detail 
the nature of freedom, the emotional factors which inhibit it, and the prospects 
of its enhancement, this time in the context of psychological automatism: “to 
what extent are we controlled, unconsciously, by an automatic psychic 
mechanism?” (Merton & Bamberger, unpublished). 
 
Merton and Bamberger preface the discussion by acknowledging that there are 
certain human functions which are necessarily automatic. Unless, however, we 
are freed from automatism in non-necessary areas, we will be unable to develop 
according to the will of God nor will we be able to become independent mature 
persons. This maturity and development in the will of God is understood as the 
freedom to love, the perfection of which is sanctity. Should we remain on a 
merely automatic and passive level, there is no possibility of leading a loving or 
holy life.32 Here we can arguably see the influence of Erich Fromm on Merton, in 
the example of the man conditioned by automatic political responses, and 
                                                          
32 Merton and Bamberger add that if we are not elevated beyond automatic responses we will love only 
ourselves. I would question whether we could even be said to love ourselves given the absence of freedom. 
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indeed in the statement that “totalitarian states seek to produce automatic 
men” (Merton & Bamberger, unpublished:1). 
 
Now the crux of the matter begins to emerge, in a point resembling the above 
claim that the neurotic may mistake the movements of repressed emotions for 
divine inspiration. Merton and Bamberger define sanctity as “being directed 
inwardly by the Spirit of God – special inspirations moving us directly”, and warn 
that we might ascribe such inspiration to what are merely “mechanical 
impulses” (Merton and Bamberger, unpublished: 1). In fact, rather than being 
devoted to God, such automatons have a private religion and morality, again 
reminding us of the counterfeit religion Merton describes above. Here we 
encounter something reminiscent of Freud’s Über-Ich, in persons who have 
prescribed for themselves strict and superstitious obligations which are a matter 
of great disturbance if not upheld.33 
 
This is the infantile and immature conscience, dominated by automatic 
biological and social responses rather than genuine freedom and inspiration. In 
an ostensible contrast to my first chapter, Merton and Bamberger here begin to 
place guilt at the centre of this account of the immature personality. This is 
nothing more than a pseudo-guilt, however, not born of moral principles but 
instead originating in the failure to measure up to a self-imposed moral code and 
illusory self-image.34 In the teeth of these impossible standards, the immature 
                                                          
33 This phenomenon might well be closer to Horney’s “tyranny of the should”, given that Merton and 
Bamberger’s character self-prescribes the obligations whereas Freud’s Über-Ich is a product mainly of the 
demands of family and culture. See (Horney, 1950: 64-85). 
34 Merton would later distinguish between guilt as anxiety over disobedience to an exterior authority, and 
genuine sin as a violation of the divine law at the centre of one’s being. Guilt in this account is largely about 
being exposed, rather than having erred. Notwithstanding the enormous spectrum of Merton’s influences, 
we might suppose here an example of the penetration of psychological work into Merton’s writings on 
spirituality (Merton, 2003: 118-119). (Merton, 2003) is also noteworthy for a section on contemplation and 
neurosis, in which Merton discusses the manner in which neurotic and schizoid conflicts can confuse 
contemplation with escapism and the obsessive drive for perfection, rationalizing each with contemplative 
formulae. Merton also discusses how some types of religious experience merely succeed in releasing 
hitherto unconscious emotions or libido, rather than genuine contemplation. The Inner Experience is thus a 
further example of the manner in which Merton deploys his reading of psychological texts in the service of 
contemplation, which Merton here understands as the emergence of the inner self which is united to Christ 
through the Incarnation (Merton, 2003: 27f, 39, 110-114). 
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person is plunged into inadequacy and ultimately what is supposed as guilt. 
Here, however, Merton and Bamberger seem to place anxiety as a response to 
this guilt, which I would argue diverges from both “The Neurotic Personality…” 
and from Karen Horney’s account (to which the paragraph bears other clear 
parallels). Arguably this invites the question of why there is a need to measure 
oneself against a fabricated self-image in the first place, and hence whether 
there might not be a phase prior to anxiety/guilt which demands consideration. 
 
To guilt is also ascribed the energy which moves the immature person to fulfil 
the various routines by which adequacy is sought. Since the feeling of 
inadequacy, however, is rooted far deeper than any observance can touch, the 
sufferer remains in constant interior struggle, in a battle to be rid of guilt and 
feel worthy. A vicious circle ensues, wherein the sufferer becomes increasingly 
anxious by reason of failing to allay the guilt, and hence turns again to futile 
observances in the vain hope of succour. Again here Merton points to the 
distinction between felt anxiety and unconscious anxiety, in which the person’s 
environment might again become the object of recrimination as a result of his 
“delusions and prejudices” (Merton and Bamberger, unpublished: 2).35 
 
2.2 The Infantile Conscience (Merton and Bamberger, unpublished: 2f) 
 
Merton and Bamberger now turn to a comparison between the person described 
above and the person prior to the development of reason. The main point is that 
pre-rational humans are not yet free persons thinking and making decisions for 
themselves. Instead, they begin in dependency on others, before starting to 
become individuals in adolescence. Following development from the 
undifferentiated stage of consciousness and the possession of mere drives, the 
child begins to perceive itself as distinct, and develop a mechanical and 
transitory conscience. It lives - and here is the comparison with the character 
                                                          
35 In (Horney, 1950: 110-154) the personages of the environment might also be the subject of imagined 
recrimination directed towards the person.  
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structure described above - by a system of internalised dictates to which it 
responds automatically, instinctively, and passively. Even were it to rebel, at 
this stage, its resistance would be driven by another outside influence passively 
absorbed, rather than genuine interior freedom.  
 
Here we begin to see the emergence of Merton’s burgeoning immersion in 
personalist philosophy, in the contrast of good parenting with bad. The latter 
involves the child merely absorbing the tastes, attitudes, ways of thinking, or 
rules, of the parents, often by irrational, arbitrary, and capricious means of 
punishment. By its nascent standards of value and reason, the child is able to 
sense something of the injustice of inconsistent treatment, but finds its protests 
unrecognised and can merely store up its resentment and discontent in the 
depths of the unconscious. Consequently, a theme developed at length in 
Horney, approval and safety begin to depend on consent to the incoherence of 
its environment, with tragic consequences for self-worth. Just as tragic is the 
sort of parenting which projects its own fears or faults onto a child, in the 
expectation that it will develop particular vices which in turn it feels doomed to 
actualise.   
 
2.3 The Development of Conscience (Merton and Bamberger, unpublished: 3f) 
 
Good parenting, on the contrary, focuses on developing a climate of freedom 
and reason, a personal conscience, rather than mere formation by dictate. This 
personal conscience first becomes a prospect when the child becomes capable of 
love for neighbour and for God. It is only here that there is the capacity for 
moral development and for growth. Here the personalist flavour of Merton’s 
thought emerges clearly, since development is said to depend on inter-personal 
dialogue, between “hearts, wills, freedoms” (Merton and Bamberger, 
unpublished: 3). This precludes the type of situation wherein the child remains 
dependent on the parent for everything, passively and mechanically producing 
the requisite reactions. In a penetrating analysis which is rich with import if a 
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little brief and unsourced, Merton and Bamberger challenge the assumption that 
such a parental attitude comprises genuine love or recognises the child as a 
person, a real being. Indeed, were the parents to do so, they would prize and 
cultivate the uniqueness of the child. 
 
The authors then point to the tension produced by the internalization – 
“introjection” – of the standards of the parents. This is the distinction between 
the love which responds to objective goods, and the subjective pseudo-love 
which merely performs rituals of self-satisfaction in the demand for approval. In 
order to stifle feelings of guilt and anxiety, the mechanisms of the internalized 
conscience eclipse the natural tendency to rational thought, and hence destroy 
the possibility of love for genuine values.36 Again the question arises as to 
whether this analysis of the manner in which the mechanisms of approval seek to 
allay anxiety sufficiently recognises Horney’s understanding of its origin. Here, 
however, I would merely like to highlight how Merton (with Bamberger) has 
begun to integrate psychoanalytic and personalist theories of the importance of 
childhood development with the moral philosophy/theology of love, freedom, 
and conscience. We might also suggest that Merton’s own experience of 
authority colours both his approach and his passion for this issue, as well as his 
own way of being in authority. On the whole this clearly demonstrates reflexivity 
and a dialogical integration of psychological research into theological writing. 
 
2.4: Mechanisms of Adolescence (Merton and Bamberger, unpublished: 4) 
 
Merton and Bamberger then begin to outline the tensions involved in the 
transitional stage of adolescence. I will focus less attention on this aspect of the 
paper, given the interim nature of the adolescent stage. It is nonetheless 
important for demonstrating the overall place of developmental theory in 
                                                          
36 Incidentally I think that this is in outline a fertile approach to a dialogue between psychoanalysis and the 
phenomenology of value, particularly considering the role which early development plays in the perception 
of goods.  
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Merton’s thought, and indeed is a phase reminiscent of the battleground of the 
stunted conscience described above. This is a period of increased conflict 
between the series of pairs outlined above, between the infantile and the 
mature, the mechanical and the free, and subjective and objective love. An 
adequate conclusion to this stage would see the emergence of a genuine love for 
objective goods, in contrast to the type of behaviour which we have seen is 
measured to receive approval and security. To cope with the struggle to develop 
conscience, we begin the process of intellectual justification of our instinctual 
drives, whilst at the same time embarking on an erratic quest to master them, 
and finally increasingly identify with individuals or groups from our environment 
to secure acceptance. Finally, Merton and Bamberger distinguish the passing and 
relatively common scrupulosity of the adolescent from the adult conscience 
which remains marked by scruples characterised either by anxiety, shame, guilt, 
or disgust (Merton and Bamberger, unpublished: 5). In the first instance, 
excessive attention to sin is seen as a developmental stage, whilst in the latter is 
a sign of arrested development.  
 
2.5 The Mature Conscience (Merton and Bamberger, unpublished: 5-6) 
 
Having discussed the infantile conscience and its roots in early development, 
Merton and Bamberger turn to a consideration of its antithesis and the subject of 
the paper, the mature conscience. This consists – according to what seems like a 
scholastic framework – of an act of the practical intellect judging the morality of 
our actions. According to the authors it has three characteristics: the capacity to 
evaluate, the capacity for responsibility, and the capacity for self-judgement.  
 
Concerning the first, this consists in understanding “subjective and objective 
moral characteristics of an action…in the light of truth” (Merton and Bamberger, 
unpublished: 5). We witness again the willingness to inform philosophy and 
theology with psychological themes in the integration of this traditional aspect 
of conscience with the psychological theory discussed above, in which they 
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stress that this concern with truth is contrasted with the immature intellect 
merely inhabited by dictates internalised by rote. The capacity to evaluate 
involves identifying and accepting evil in one’s actions without the psychological 
defences of projection or denial. The mature conscience is aware of the reality 
of temptation against the moral law and the possibility of erring, but also of his 
capacity to resist and grow in virtue. This is contrasted with the immature 
renunciation of freedom, wherein bondage to automatic measures is preferred 
to the acknowledgement of our potential to be wrong and worthy of blame. 
 
Secondly, the responsible conscience takes one’s actions and their consequences 
upon oneself, accepting their origin in freedom. Here one accept the obligation 
to be attentive to one’s actions, and to learn from mistakes, and finally do not 
resort to blame of supernatural agencies or plead helplessness. Thirdly, the 
capacity to judge one’s actions again concerns the barometer of self-esteem and 
whether it depends on the nature of one’s activity or on exterior factors like 
conformity and respect. In this instance, maturity entails an absence of 
hysterical or exaggerated emotions, since a mature person is able to avoid 
slipping into depression when erring. Secondly the mature self-judgement is not 
based on comparison with others because it does not depend on exterior 
approval. And finally, the mature person uses sin as a stimulus to develop, 
responding in simplicity and humility so as to undergo real moral change.  
 
2.6 Conclusion of “The Mature Conscience” (Merton and Bamberger, 
unpublished: 7) 
 
Finally, Merton and Bamberger summarise the foregoing, and attempt to draw 
out its implications, beginning with a warning against tendencies which make a 
fetish of the science of psychology, as for instance supposing that there is a 
series of objective formulae which can be applied to any person to elicit change. 
Instead, the purpose of the paper is to encourage readers to cultivate genuine 
human dialectical participation despite the inhibitions of automatic psychic 
43 
0704345  
processes. Instead, knowledge of these processes can help us guard against a 
false humility which is actually inadequacy, and recognising the complexity and 
confusion of the infantile mind strive for the development of genuine simplicity 
of intention and responsibility before God. The conclusion, therefore, continues 
the general character of the paper in calling attention to the dangers of 
confusing a mind compulsively or obsessively occupied with its faults and the 
observance of rules with a genuine mature mind which is able to reach out after 
true values in simple and free love.   
 
2.7: Comments 
 
In general the approach to freedom in this paper is a clear example of the 
method of integration and dialogue, as well as most likely having been informed 
by Merton’s own struggle for freedom. Here a personalist philosophy of freedom 
is informed with insights from psychodynamic theory, namely internalization, 
projection and denial. In my view the section contrasting the mature conscience 
with its stunted anti-type is an especially revealing example of how 
psychological research can be used to illumine moral theology and philosophy. At 
the same time, however, we are faced with a recurring problem, insofar as the 
paper also interprets freedom and sanctity as involving direction by the Spirit, 
and hence subtly answers the question of freedom along the same hierarchical 
lines as we have seen above. This will be a central theme of the next chapter, in 
which we shall see how this direction by the Spirit arguably means the evasion of 
freedom in the work of Erich Fromm. Hence, the surrender to the Spirit 
espoused here as a paradigm of maturity becomes vulnerable, as the 
corresponding immaturity begins to be nothing more than a flight from surrender 
to God. 
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2.8: Introduction to Christian Mysticism 
 
Whilst master of students (1951-1955) and then master of novices (1955-1965), 
Thomas Merton was responsible for the spiritual and intellectual formation of 
those in the first stages of monastic life. Merton’s journals and letters of this 
period attest to his enthusiasm in integrating the findings of contemporary 
psychology into his own life and the lives of those under his care (with mixed 
results) (Waldron, 2001: 60ff). Part of this attempt can be seen in his series of 
conference notes from 1961 published as Introduction to Christian Mysticism: 
Initiation into the Monastic Tradition: Bk 3. The 12th chapter of this text is 
entitled “Direction and Therapy”, and is divided into the subsections 1. 
“[D]irection as distinct from counselling, psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis”; 2. 
“[D]oes [the] director have any use for psychology?”; and, 3. “[P]ractical use of 
this psychological knowledge”. These pages, committed to writing some seven 
years after Merton’s initial re-evaluation of psychoanalysis, enable us to see how 
his understanding of the possibility of the integration of psychology into spiritual 
life have developed. They are also especially remarkable for the role they 
occupy in an otherwise fairly traditional exposition of the classics of Christian 
mysticism, which again demonstrates how Merton – in spite of his formal 
seclusion and absence of psychological training – lived on the threshold of the 
cloister and the world. 
 
2.9: Counselling (Merton, 2008: 280ff) 
 
Merton begins this section of his conferences by considering the distinction 
between counselling, psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis, in order to prepare for 
a further delineation of spiritual direction. Counselling concerns general advice 
on the psychophysical aspects of moral problems, especially as these relate to 
adaptation to a social situation.38 The aim of counselling is primarily personal 
                                                          
38 All the references to counselling are from (Merton, 2008: 280ff). Incidentally, it is not quite clear what 
psychophysical means here. 
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balance through practical advice on the typical problems of the day. 39 Hence it 
is only of limited relevance in spiritual matters, since it deals with these 
inasmuch as they relate to other more general problems. Merton goes onto 
critique the type of counselling which he is considering by accusing it of aiming 
at conformity and the preservation of the common mentality. We will see later 
how this relates to Merton’s reading of Fromm, and hence need not consider it 
here, especially since Merton is rather vague in identifying his intended target.  
 
Next he turns to “counselling in a religious milieu (particularly Catholic)”. 
Something of a remainder concept left over from the sacrament of confession 
and formal spiritual direction, Merton describes this as primarily ethical but 
ideally often touching on spiritual matters. It might involve psychological or 
sociological advice, which should be subordinate to Scripture and Church 
teaching.40 Somewhat enigmatically, Merton concludes this section by suggesting 
that religious counselling deals in great measure with matters of Church law, 
without further clarification as to whether this is mainly moral, psychological, or 
pedagogical. In general since little here relates to the psychological themes with 
which he is otherwise occupied, there is scant need for us to linger here.  
 
2.10: Psychotherapy (Merton, 2008: 282f) 
 
More importantly, Merton now begins perhaps his most definite discussion of the 
nature of psychotherapy, distinguishing it first from the type of counselling 
discussed above. Psychotherapy, in contrast to the relative normality of the 
counselee, “implies that [the client] (though not ‘abnormal’) is at least suffering 
from serious neurosis” (Merton, 2008: 282). Recalling similar assertions from 
earlier texts, Merton again questions the notion of a strict boundary between 
                                                          
39 Indeed we might be better aware now that certain forms of training in counselling are now deeply 
concerned with matters more commonly associated with depth psychology. 
40 We might also ask whether this looks like what Kugelmann depicts as the presence of the Vatican as a 
third-party in counselling sessions (Kugelmann, 2011: 413). 
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mental health and neurosis by claiming that even mostly well-functioning people 
of his time also commonly manifest symptoms of neurosis or problems with 
personality or emotional life, or psychosomatic difficulties. Bolder still is the 
assertion that “the proportion of neurotics in our society is so high that it would 
be absurd to draw a strict line between them and ‘healthy people’” (Merton, 
2008: 282).41 The distinction between the common run of these problems, 
concerning which Merton assures the hearer/reader that there is nothing 
seriously wrong, and genuine mental illness, is the ability to handle them in a 
“valid and mature fashion” (Merton, 2008: 283).42 This section is also useful for 
further clarifying Merton’s working taxonomy of neurotic disorders, including 
“perfectionism, obsessions, compulsions, scruples, diffuse anxiety, [and] severe 
uncharitableness” (Merton, 2008: 283). 
 
A further distinction between psychotherapy and counselling helps us to see 
Merton’s understanding of the former in greater resolution. Because it assumes 
at least minor neurosis as present in the client, psychotherapy exceeds the range 
of counselling, and the depth of consideration of the relevant personal 
problems. Secondly, the therapist has more than an advisory role, working 
through the particular problems of the client and aiming for a resolution, or at 
least new insight. Thirdly, Merton perhaps displays an influence from the then-
incipient relational turn in psychotherapy when claiming that therapy depends 
on personal identification of client with therapist. Here the former is opened to 
the personhood of the latter, and hence liberated from the neurotic tendency to 
see the world through the lens of self. Finally, and most significantly, a 
summative definition which is worth citing in full: 
The aim of therapy is to ‘heal’ (to some extent) traumatic wounds in the 
psyche by bringing  them to conscious awareness and showing the patient 
how to deal with them in a rational and mature fashion, instead of by 
                                                          
41 Again we might have expected such a claim to be sourced with empirical research, notwithstanding the 
originally oral transmission of the text.  
42 Perhaps we can assume that maturity here carries the same content as in “The Mature Conscience”, i.e. 
freedom, interiority, responsibility, etc.  
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subconscious and infantile subterfuges which do not  work. (Merton, 2008: 
283) 
 
2.11: Psychoanalysis (Merton, 2008: 284-286) 
 
The text now turns to psychoanalysis, in Merton’s estimation a form of therapy 
of deeper reach and longer duration. It is worth noting again here that this text 
was written in 1961, when Catholic discussions of psychoanalysis were largely 
critiques of the theories of Freud, again testimony to the scope of Merton’s 
hunger for knowledge (Kugelmann, 2011). Psychoanalysis, says Merton, has a 
more intimate and radical intention, aiming to reshape the personality (rather 
than simply rebalancing it). In Freud, this proceeds by investigation into the 
developmental roots of a difficulty, and some attempt at reliving the stages of 
stunted development to which one has regressed, with the emphasis on sexual 
development (Merton, 2008: 284). The focus of Jungian analysis, on the other 
hand, is on the religious symbols inherited by the whole of humanity in our 
collective unconscious, and the dormant power which can be awakened by 
bringing these to consciousness. Again the relation between analyst and client is 
important, and more so given the depth and length of the procedure, but Merton 
seems unaware of the basic tensions between the stance of relational 
psychotherapy and Freudian psychoanalysis. 
 
2.12: Spiritual Direction 
 
This stratification of counselling, psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis concludes 
by distinguishing them from spiritual direction (Merton, 2008: 284). This 
essentially focuses on the relationship of the person with God, and hence is able 
to consider, for instance, sin as sin, in contrast to the psychological attention on 
the maturity with which a person copes with it. At this point a partisan approach 
48 
0704345  
might content itself with the observation that there is a distinct realm for the 
spiritual director which cannot be taken over by analysis, but Merton also points 
out the converse. Given that spirituality depends on a healthy psyche, and that 
psychotherapy and psychoanalysis are concerned with the health of the “psychic 
and emotional organism” (Merton, 2008: 2004), any approach that rendered 
them superfluous in the presence of an able spiritual director is simply naïve. 
Indeed, even an adequate reception of the sacraments depends on psychic 
health, and neurotic difficulties cannot be resolved by the confession of sin or 
spiritual guidance.43  
 
In my view this is a major point, again demonstrating Merton’s willingness to 
engage in reciprocal dialogue even to the extent of using psychology to inform 
his approach to sacramental theology. I would, however, argue that there is 
some tension between Merton’s assertion that neurosis prevents the person from 
judging spiritual matters adequately, and a further claim that therapy and 
analysis deal with the pre-spiritual realm. If neurosis can hinder spiritual 
judgement it is hard to see how this coheres with analysis being pre-spiritual. 
Furthermore, assuming an existential approach to the inextricable embodiment 
of our concrete lives, and the importance of physical awareness in recent 
psychotherapeutic theory, that is, I would be inclined to suggest that both 
embodiment and psychology do necessarily impact on all areas of life. 
 
In the section immediately following these remarks, we can perhaps see a 
condensed view of Merton’s understanding of the question of integration, 
beginning with his assertion that the director should know enough psychological 
theory to see when a person is neurotic (Merton, 2008: 286).44 Moreover, 
psychological knowledge would assist the director in recognising the strictures 
that character structure places on the ability to absorb information, and hence 
                                                          
43 Merton also reiterates the point made above that self-will can exacerbate neurosis rather than cure it. 
We are also reminded how Merton is consistently straddling two worlds, since he reiterates the traditional 
Catholic claim that the director speaks in a supernatural fashion as the instrument of God. 
44 Merton also cites the permission then required from ecclesial authorities in making a referral to a 
Freudian psychoanalyst.  
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in recognising the appropriate level of direction. Psychology here is seen to be of 
foundational importance to the human ability to communicate and learn, 
arguably analogous to the way in which the subconscious mind is said to set the 
scene of the relationship with God in prayer in Merton’s No Man is an Island 
(Merton, 1955: 20-45). An important indication of the extent to which he has 
integrated psychological thinking is given in Merton’s claim that the director 
must be able to recognise unconscious communication, as for instance we have 
seen in his treatment of transference. He also touches here on psychological 
defence mechanisms, without naming them, as for instance when a person might 
conceal their weakest points with a profession of strength.45 Next, Merton again 
exhibits his deep concern for the relationship between psychology and social 
matters, when advising that the director have a knowledge of group psychology 
so as to understand when a person will most profit from increased communal 
activity, and when it might be unproductive (Merton, 2008: 287). 
 
Finally, concerning the role of psychology in the life of the director, Merton 
turns to the matter of culpability in sin. The director must be aware of the 
psychological factors which can mitigate responsibility, specifying neurasthenic, 
schizoid, cyclothymic, paranoiac, and hysterical disorders. These lead into some 
general prescriptions, concerning the reduced capacity for will-driven ascecis, 
the possibility that the director might be manipulated by neurotic demands, the 
danger of jest or posturing, and a warning against adopting the role of 
psychiatrist (Merton, 2008: 289). Concerning the first of these Merton makes the 
important point that the spiritual difficulties of the neurotic are often bound up 
with an inadequate perception of the nature of religion. This interesting and 
important point is left undeveloped, such that we might wonder what is implicit 
therein. Perhaps it reflects the ongoing personal transition from ascesis to 
humanism that we shall see in subsequent chapters, or the related question of 
the place of the neurotic self-images and search for perfection which Merton 
adopts from the work of Horney. 
                                                          
45 One might compare this with the mechanism of reaction formation, whereby one overemphasises a 
certain aspect of personality in order to compensate for or mask the absence of an opposed trait. See 
(Kahn, 2002: 230-32), and (Martin, 2010: 625). 
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The director should, on the other hand, operate with honesty, person-affirming 
love, and encouragement which fosters all that is generally human.46 In addition, 
direction should foster realism (in particular surrounding any tendency to 
confuse repression of instinct with virtue), and oppose obsession and compulsion 
(Merton, 2008: 290f). In obsession, the issue is with a morbid and narcissistic 
preoccupation with one’s own problems, whilst in compulsion we are reminded 
of the relationship between self-ascribed duty and the flight from anxiety. 
Finally the remedy of a genuine appreciation and response to value and persons 
is again proposed as the real alternative to the infantile mentality. 
 
To conclude the elaboration of this section in Merton’s Introduction…, a 
particularly important point is made concerning the overall purpose of the 
foregoing pages, one which anticipates the later character of Merton’s spiritual 
writings. Whilst it is important to pick up on the point that this concerns the 
psychological function of the director, Merton synthesises this chapter by adding 
that the director should aim at helping “the penitent fully to be himself” 
(Merton, 2008: 291). This entails a reconciliation of the divisions within oneself, 
and salvaging any good elements of natural life which he has shunned (perhaps 
under the burden of a misguided understanding of Christian life). It will be of 
great importance to this project to note that this stress on genuine selfhood is 
later to assume central place in Merton’s spiritual thought, even though it is 
here framed psychologically and in the context of the previous assertion that 
psychotherapy/analysis is pre-spiritual. Moreover, the director is responsible for 
seeing that the “penitent does not compel himself to throw away the best of 
himself” (Merton, 2008: 292), which again I would argue is a rather progressive 
approach to Catholic spirituality given centuries of insistence on contempt of 
nature and self. 
 
                                                          
46 And avoids false supernaturalism! 
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This stress on selfhood is then put in the context of the transition from secular 
to religious life, again stressing the need for harmony between the notions of 
self involved in both (Merton, 2008: 292). Here, the danger of inflated 
interpretations of the new religious identity is raised, inasmuch as this might 
develop as an evasion of one’s problems, an attempt of sorts at denial or 
rejection of what is now deemed contemptible. And, closing with this point, 
Jungian individuation theory is used to sketch the whole passage between pre-
religious and religious life, particularly concerning the tendency to initially 
develop a religious persona to adapt to the new form of life.47 This persona can 
come at the cost of the rejection of those aspects of the personality which are 
deemed unworthy, but which may indeed be central facets of the real 
personality. The reconciliation – here attesting to Merton’s relevance to the 
general theme of integration – takes place when those suppressed aspects are 
rediscovered, and given room to breathe, reconciling the interior self with the 
social self adopted for adaptation. This is an antidote to the melancholy which 
can develop in one who is deeply yet unknowingly troubled by the restlessness 
which comes from the denial of the personality, and results in the restoration of 
“all that is humanly best and vital in the penitent: warmth, geniality, {an} ability 
to love and to give” (Merton, 2008: 294). 
 
In my view this last section, concerning the need for psychology in spiritual 
direction, is a deeply significant and illuminating example of the ongoing 
transition in the person of Thomas Merton. Here, particularly in the theme of 
reintegration that draws on the work of Jung, the director is seen as helping the 
monk to be himself, by rediscovering aspects of the personality rejected upon 
entering religious life. Moreover it manifests the extent to which psychological 
ideas of selfhood, and by extension a new openness to the many varieties of 
human nature, have begun to inform and challenge the previously ascetical 
emphasis of Merton’s work. Without forgetting the ascetical aspects of the 
                                                          
47 Merton elsewhere devotes a section of a paper to Jungian analysis, but the focus is largely on Jung’s 
approach to historicity and the question of whether dogma and traditional religious observance can ever be 
psychologically adequate for the historical person of the time. Merton praises Jung for upholding the 
Augustinian conception of spiritual order in the soul, but claims that he is wrong in asserting that dogma 
and observance are obsolete. He gives little justification for this position, and the limited scope of the 
article renders it largely uninteresting relative to the present project. See (Merton, unpublished). 
52 
0704345  
remainder of the lectures around which Merton’s Introduction to Christian 
Mysticism is formed, psychological theory is coming to be increasingly 
foundational in his approach to spirituality. That this foundational role was also 
in the case in “The Neurotic Personality…” is clear, however the question is 
beginning to emerge as to the structure which is erected upon the foundation. 
What, that is, is an adequate conception of the nature of religion (contrasted to 
the inadequate perception depicted in this section), and has Merton’s own 
understanding of religion and theology begun to become more humanist, more 
worldly, and as we shall subsequently ask, more Frommian? 
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Chapter Three: Erich Fromm on Psychoanalysis, Humanism, and 
Religion 
 
Erich Fromm was born in Frankfurt in 1900, with both paternal and maternal 
rabbinical descent.  He obtained a doctorate in sociology from Heidelberg 
University in 1922, before training as a lay (i.e. non-medical) psychoanalyst. For 
most of his career Fromm taught psychoanalysis in New York and Mexico, before 
settling in Switzerland for his final years and dying in 1980. The main thrust in 
his early work lies in exploring the social dimension of the psyche, and the 
extent to which social factors have to be understood in psychoanalysis and vice 
versa (Durkin, 2014: 22).  In his later works a shift in emphasis can be seen, as 
Fromm begins to gather together and centralise themes also present in his early 
work, on the importance of love, living, and being. Fromm's treatment of these 
issues is arguably given its appeal in juxtaposing them against the analyses of 
unhealthy character states and socio-economic structures from his earlier 
writings. Fromm’s thought has been described as radical humanism, since it 
focuses on our development and our liberation from any freedom-inhibiting 
political, economic, or psychological forces.48 Kieran Durkin has recently argued 
that Fromm's work is humanist first and foremost, and that it revolves around a 
core of “spiritual autonomy [and] the idea that man must 'develop his own 
powers' and reach the goal of complete independence” (Durkin, 2014: 2,50). 
 
I will continue my analysis of psychological themes in the writings of Thomas 
Merton by focusing my fourth chapter on his dialogue with Erich Fromm. In 
preparation for this, the present chapter will seek to exhibit and analyse some 
of the prominent themes in the early works of Fromm first encountered by 
Merton. Before we turn to consider in some depth Fromm’s Psychoanalysis and 
Religion, I will first put that text into the context of some of the central tenets 
                                                          
48 Kieran Durkin enumerates a variety of adjectives with which Fromm modifies humanism -“normative 
humanism, socialist humanism, renaissance humanism, enlightenment humanism, dialectic humanism, and 
mere humanism” – before his first use of radical humanism in 1966. I will settle for mere humanism, since 
this is the term used in Psychoanalysis and Religion and by Merton (Durkin, 2014: 3). 
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from Fromm’s other major early writings The Fear of Freedom and Man for 
Himself. This will allow us to see clearly the guiding principles that penetrate 
Fromm's early thinking but are in less developed form in Psychoanalysis and 
Religion.49 
 
Before approaching Fromm’s writings, however, an immediate question arises: 
given that this thesis is concerned with the work of Thomas Merton, why devote 
one of only four chapters exclusively to Erich Fromm? This is due to the extent to 
which Merton’s new openness to psychoanalysis is based on his reading of Fromm 
and Horney, and particularly that it is Fromm whom Merton reads in most depth, 
and corresponds directly with for almost a decade. Relative to the criteria posed 
by Robert Kugelmann, this exchange is arguably a prime example of Merton’s 
dialogical credentials, the existential impact of Fromm’s thought being 
manifested in his letters, and also his appreciation of Fromm’s awareness of the 
provisional nature of human symbols (reflected in the latter’s resistance to idols 
of a conceptual and political nature). More importantly, Merton repeatedly 
professes to agree with Fromm on matters concerning psychoanalysis, religion, 
and humanism, and claims to share Fromm’s views on alienation. This includes 
the assertion of a consistency between the psychoanalysist and Merton’s 
priesthood based on the centrality of humanism in both.  
 
Understanding the salient aspects of Fromm’s work will therefore be of crucial 
importance to considering the development of Merton’s attitude not only to 
psychology, but to religion and the person. Ultimately, however, we are 
concerned with the question of integration, and, given Merton’s repeated 
attempts to incorporate the work of Fromm into his own thought, a solid grasp 
of Fromm’s consistent body of early work is arguably essential in enabling us to 
address the consistency of Merton’s enthusiasm for Fromm with his continuing 
                                                          
49 Durkin's radical humanist reading of Fromm's corpus is based on the existence of a “generally continuous 
development of a central nucleus of ideas throughout his various writings“, and “a core position of great 
stability” which Durkin locates in the early encounters with Jewish humanism, the psychoanalysis of Freud, 
and the sociology of Karl Marx (Durkin, 2014: 11, 42).  Durkin does, however, identify “subtle shifts” in his 
summary of Fromm's writings (Durkin, 2014: 17). 
55 
0704345  
commitment to Christian theology. Finally, in considering the transition of 
Merton - depicted by David Cooper – from a world-denying ascesis to a radical 
humanism, I will ask whether something of Fromm’s dialectic of freedom is 
manifesting in Merton’s own historical journey, perhaps even enduring in the late 
Merton’s approach to integration.  
 
3.1: The Fear of Freedom 
 
Erich Fromm’s The Fear of Freedom analyses the socio-political, psychological 
and existential factors involved in “the meaning of freedom for modern man”, 
and in the then-typical character structures as Fromm understood them (Fromm, 
2001 [1941]: iix, 89ff). Given our limited scope, the socio-political dimension 
concerns us only indirectly here, since the existential dichotomies that lead to 
the dilemma of freedom and the possibility of alienation are of primary 
relevance to the understanding of religion.50 Here Fromm argues that the human 
being is unique amongst animals, since the evolution of self-consciousness and 
moral freedom mean that we have lost our original instinctual harmony with the 
natural world (Fuller, 2008: 196).51 Hence we no longer feel merely a part of 
nature, are free as well as instinctual, lost as well as at home, and have the 
consequent need to fashion an orientation for ourselves in the world. This is the 
ground for Fromm’s theory of dialectical freedom, involving the relationship 
between freedom from primary ties (natural, family, and socio-political) and 
freedom to develop oneself.52 I read this dialectic as the central category in The 
Fear of Freedom, and one which founds his work on psychoanalysis, religion and 
humanism, and hence will dwell on it a while longer (Fromm, 2001 [1941]:1-32). 
                                                          
50 Fromm elaborates his understanding of our existential needs in his later (Fromm, 2002: 27-66), as 
relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, identity, orientation, and devotion. I cannot consider these in 
depth here, but they are discussed in (Thomson, 2009: 27-30), and (Durkin, 2014: 79-80). Thomson (2009: 
128) agrees that the existential needs and paradoxes are Fromm's starting point. 
51 Thomson (2004: 68) also questions whether Fromm leaves enough instinct to account for the findings of 
evolutionary biology. 
52 According to Fuller, primary ties are those existing prior to individuation, whilst secondary ties are formed 
to compensate for the absence of prior ones (Fuller, 2008: 199). 
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Fromm situates his work in the aftermath of the battles for human freedom in 
the early modern period, the liberation from oppressive political and religious 
structures, and the acquisition of “freedom from”. Fromm sees the great 
mistake of interpreting this period in assuming that mere emancipation from 
external structures is freedom in itself. Instead, this is only the first stage of 
freedom, a necessary but insufficient condition. Freedom is also endangered by 
our internal tendencies, mainly that of evading the question of freedom by 
divesting our own powers and responsibility to an exterior power in order to find 
security (Fromm, 2001 [1941]: 18). Fromm roots this in the idea that the human 
place in the cosmos is deeply threatening and confusing, and the question of 
freedom a terrifying one. Hence, rather than simply being liberated from 
oppressive regimes, we must recognise our own unconscious tendency to seek 
out tyrants or mass conformity in order to escape from the unbearable agony of 
being alone and confused in the cosmos (Fromm, 2001 [1941]: ix).53 
 
Once the insufficiency of mere “freedom from” – or negative freedom – has been 
established, we can turn to “freedom to”, or positive freedom (Fromm, 2001 
[1941]:221ff). Presupposing negative freedom, this is the process by which we 
become creative, productive, rational, and relational, and so unite ourselves 
with our world and species. This is the freedom to realise self, to take 
responsibility and possession of one’s powers and use them lovingly, and so 
fashion a home upon the earth.54 Here we face the problem of freedom rather 
than evading it, and take possession of our own powers rather than renouncing 
them. 
 
                                                          
53 Fromm would later say that all our anxiety is sourced in isolation, and that our deepest need is to 
overcome it. (Fromm, 1957: 15). Durkin agrees that The Fear of Freedom and Fromm's work in general are 
characterised by the analysis of aloneness and its avoidance (Durkin, 2014: 28-29). 
54 Durkin's radical humanist interpretation of Fromm affirms his work relative to what he describes as an 
anti-humanist turn in the philosophy and social science of the latter half of the 20th Century. Part of this 
involves endorsing Fromm's work on selfhood over methods that subsume the self in language, history, 
society, etc. Clearly this is beyond the remit of this paper, but it is worth bearing in mind that Fromm 
assumes that the concept of self is a fruitful one (Durkin, 2014: 129-164). 
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 3.2: Man for Himself  
 
In his Man for Himself, Fromm attempts to make this basic thesis on 
positive/negative freedom a foundation for an ethical theory maintaining both 
subjective and objective poles.55 First the political examples of tyranny have an 
ethical analogue in the authoritarian conscience, wherein moral responsibility is 
ceded to an exterior power (Fromm, 1949: 143ff).56 Obedience then becomes 
the foundation for human activity and identity, as we find security in the evasion 
of freedom. Here Fromm develops Freud’s Über-Ich, where a system of exterior 
dictates – from parents or church or state for instance – becomes internalized as 
an irrepressible code of conduct (Fromm, 1949: 34). The person is then 
protected from the burden of existing by ceding moral responsibility to this 
internalized authority. For Fromm this is alienation, wherein the person becomes 
estranged from self (Fuller, 2008: 198). 
 
Fromm, however, is no anarchist, being careful to distinguish between rational 
authority and an irrational authority consisting in obedience for the sake of 
security. In the former, the authority is at the service of human development. 
Hence, the human becomes an end for itself, as in the title Man for Himself. 
This is anthropocentric not in placing us at the centre of the universe with 
complete moral licence, but instead in rooting judgements in concrete human 
existence and the conditions for human well-being. Again this self-development 
is the ethical aspect of positive freedom, and the basis for Fromm’s humanism. 
He argues, finally, that this is rooted in empirical science, since on the basis of 
adverse psychological reactions to conditions unfavourable to positive freedom 
Fromm concludes that the natural tendency of humanity is towards well-being in 
                                                          
55 Fromm justifies his exclusive use of the masculine 'man' and its correlates with reference to the German 
neuter mensch. Like Durkin, I will largely retain this form in direct citations, but replace it where possible 
with gender-neutral terms in my own writing. See (Durkin, 2014: 15), for an account of Fromm's approach 
to this matter. 
56 Thomson points out that Fromm's work with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research involved an early 
study of the authoritarian character (Thomson, 2009:10). 
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the development of reason and community.57   
 
This is an important point, since it purports to ground Fromm's humanism on 
empirical foundations. It will therefore be implicit in Fromm's humanistic 
interpretation of religion, where it is contrasted to religion built on metaphysics, 
supernatural revelation or ecclesiastical authority. Here Fromm is arguably in the 
Kantian tradition of religion subject to reason and follows Feuerbach in making 
human powers the object of religion, but seeks to develop this with existential, 
psychological, and sociological analysis. Annette Thomson comments that Fromm 
works with “the assumption that it is possible to specify what our human needs 
are and under what conditions we flourish” (Thomson, 2009: 49).58 This then 
forms an empirical premise upon which to ground the conclusion that moral – 
and religious - good pertains to human development and moral evil is that which 
stifles it. Fromm sees this as objective, but not absolute, since it is always 
subject to new empirical data.59  
 
3.3: Characterology 
 
Before moving on to consider Fromm's explicit analysis of the religious types, it 
is necessary to grasp something of his early understanding of character. Durkin – 
also drawing on other texts from the period – writes that “character forms the 
basis of the human personality, providing the generally unconscious motivation 
that is crucial in the shaping of thought and action” (Durkin, 2014: 83). Fromm 
treats this motivation in some depth in Man for Himself, defining character as a 
“system of strivings which underlie, but are not identical with, behaviour” 
                                                          
57 See (Durkin, 2014: 33-34, 144, 152, 154, 189f) and (Fuller, 2008: 210) for consideration of this empiricism 
in Fromm's writings. 
58 Thomson also suggests that Fromm's empirical method would be judged insufficiently rigorous today 
(Thomson, 2009: 49). 
59 Nor does Fromm see human nature as static or trans-temporal, in the manner often pejoratively labelled 
essentialism. Nature, instead, develops in dialectic with culture, whilst remaining “structured in specific 
ways” (namely the dynamism towards self-development and the existential paradox resulting from the
 evolution of the brain). See (Fromm, 1949: 22f), (Durkin, 2014: 143ff), and (Burston, 1991: 87). 
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(Fromm, 1949: 54).  This non-identity is seen where two opposed character 
structures behave in similar ways, as in when courage can be motivated by 
selfish ambition or devotion to an ideal. Character is a particular form of 
relating to the world which channels energy in pursuit of a goal, and which 
structures adjustment to society whilst retaining some individualised aspects 
(Fromm, 2014: 59-60).60 As we shall see, the role of psychoanalysis is to unearth 
these hidden character structures – such as receptive, exploitative, hoarding, 
marketing, masochistic, sadistic, destructive, indifferent (Durkin, 2014: 90) – 
and  disclose them as regressive or progressive responses to the dilemma of 
freedom. 
 
3.4: Psychoanalysis and Religion: Psychology and the Soul (Fromm, 1950: 1-9) 
 
Having seen how Fromm places the existential dialectic of freedom at the root 
of his ethics, we can now consider how this functions in the relationship 
between psychoanalysis and religion. I will briefly summarise the first two 
chapters of Fromm's Psychoanalysis and Religion, before concentrating on the 
third and fourth, and in particular the themes of authoritarianism, idolatry, and 
masochistic alienation. I have elected to focus on these not because they are 
necessarily more important, but because they arguably render Merton's reading 
of Fromm vulnerable. Their humanist correlates – which Merton claims to share – 
are arguably less complex and controversial, and thus these will be merely 
expounded and borne in mind throughout the chapter. 
 
Firstly the aim of Psychoanalysis and Religion is to recover what Fromm sees in 
ancient philosophy as a harmony between ethics and psychology. Ethics – the 
practical science of happiness in Aristotle – drew its main premises from the 
                                                          
60 See also (Burston, 1991: 67-68). 
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study of the psyche, with the latter ordered towards the former.61 Fromm briefly 
charts the flourishing of this mentality – through the renaissance and early 
modernity – and its demise with the advent of mechanistic and technological 
rationalism. The main aim of this sweeping genealogy is to establish the premise 
that the mechanistic turn in philosophical and scientific modernity entailed that 
psychology view its object as a machine, and hence develop a method based on 
the mere observation and stimulation of behaviour patterns (Fromm, 1950: 1-6). 
 
Fromm sees Freud – inheriting this mechanistic world-view - as both scion and 
scourge of the Enlightenment, simultaneously assuming its rationalist optimism 
and unleashing upon it the ghosts of irrationality by unearthing unconscious 
phenomena like repression and rationalization (Fromm, 1950: 6-9).62 This is 
important to my study in both respects, firstly because Fromm argues that Freud 
anticipates his humanist psychoanalytic concern for human well-being and 
freedom from illusion; and secondly Fromm emphasises and develops Freud’s 
analysis of religion as informed by unconscious motives, in this case the 
unconscious need for security and the corresponding character structures behind 
the various responses to freedom. 
 
The purpose of this historical sketch, therefore, is to attempt to rethink the 
relationship between psychoanalysis and religion by envisaging them not simply 
as enemies or allies, but to see psychoanalysis as beginning to inhabit a vacuum 
left by the ‘Death of God’. Primarily this concerns reclaiming the sphere of 
human flourishing, by retrieving the notion of soul and ascribing to it the themes 
associated with humanism. Psychoanalysis then emerges as “cure of soul” 
                                                          
61 Fromm’s retrieval of Aristotle here resembles Kugelmann’s adoption of the method of ressourcement, in 
which ancient sources are mined for their relevance to psychology and for the re-interpretation of human 
selfhood (Kugelmann, 2011: 407-411). 
62 Thomson notes how Fromm claims to have become fascinated by irrational phenomena as a school pupil 
during the 1914-1918 war. In addition she shows that this desire to explore the conflict between rational 
and irrational aspects informs Fromm's understanding of psychoanalysis until his last years (Thomson, 2009: 
5, 83). 
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(Fromm, 1950: 7, 65).63 This is of relevance to the question of religion because 
we see Fromm attempting to secure for his humanist psychoanalysis some of the 
ground traditionally claimed by religious teaching in its claim concerning – and 
over - a soul. 
  
In the second chapter Fromm briefly situates both Freud and Carl Jung within 
this paradigm. Despite Freud’s critique of traditional religion and its supposed 
basis in helplessness and regress to the infantile need for authority, Fromm 
argues that Freud’s thought is actually religious, providing we understand 
religion properly. Fromm's Freud rejects the supernatural-theistic core of 
religion and its assumed foundation in authority in order to make way for the 
ethical: “knowledge (reason, truth, logos), brotherly love, reduction of 
suffering, independence, and responsibility” (Fromm, 1950: 18). Religion thus 
conceived, Freud is proposed as an exponent.64 
 
This is re-emphasised with Fromm’s short critique of Jung, which again aims at 
challenging the assumption that Jung’s depth psychology is sympathetic towards 
religion, since Jung's conception of religion is actually one of surrender to 
unconscious forces (Fromm, 1950: 16ff). The importance of this will emerge 
when we consider Thomas Merton's attitude to God, but in the interim we can 
see its significance with recourse to The Fear of Freedom. Here Fromm 
characterises surrender as a compulsive, masochistic, and self-annihilating 
phenomenon, in contrast to one rooted in human freedom and self-realization 
(Fromm, 2001: 130,138). Jung, then, is tenuously posited as an historical anti-
type to Fromm's humanist religion, and we can now turn to the next chapter of 
his text to see Fromm's basic religious distinction. 
 
                                                          
63 Fromm justifies his use of soul on the basis of its connotations of the “higher human powers...love, 
reason, conscience, values” (Fromm, 1950: 6). I will not be concerned with whether this is an appropriate 
usage, but in the absence of a definition these powers should be borne in mind whenever soul is used. 
64 Clearly a deeper understanding of Fromm’s relationship with Freud is necessary, but beyond my remit 
here. See (Fromm, 1992) and (Burston, 1991: 189-206). 
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3.5: Types of Religious Experience (Fromm, 1950: 21-64) 
 
Fromm’s third chapter is central both in his own text and in this chapter of my 
thesis. Here he begins to develop the critical function of his psychoanalytic 
theory, in order to expose the characterological roots of authoritarian religion. 
This critique, however, transcends mere negation in also arguing for a humanistic 
core in genuine religion, akin to his revision of psychoanalysis. Firstly, it is 
important to point out that Fromm begins with an acknowledgement of the 
methodological difficulties in speaking of religion. Despite the number of non-
monotheistic religions, we tend to assume that religion refers to “a system 
centred around God and supernatural forces”, and hence the discussion of 
religion always assumes a monotheistic referent (Fromm, 1950: 24). I mention 
this since I will later ask whether Fromm is not in fact guilty of an analogous 
assumption, inasmuch as his understanding of religion shelters a number of 
prejudiced interpretations of notions such as power, transcendence, freedom, 
and God.  
 
For the time being, however, I will continue with a selective exposition of this 
chapter, beginning with Fromm's rather broad definition of religion: “any system 
of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of 
reference and an object of devotion” (Fromm, 1950: 21). Fromm assumes that 
all cultures have such structures since this need for orientation and devotion is 
existential, inasmuch as it is rooted in our human condition and consequent 
needs. Fromm's existential analysis of human life is central to a number of the 
points made in my third chapter, as it grounds the basic humanistic-authoritarian 
taxonomy of religious types, and with it the themes of authoritarianism, 
surrender, alienation, and idolatry. Given this, it is useful to recount here how 
Fromm interprets the biblical narrative of Eden as a depiction of our existential 
dilemma. 
 
As we have seen above, the emergence of self-awareness, reason, and 
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imagination have disrupted the animal harmony, such that humankind is an 
anomaly, a “freak of the universe” (Fromm, 1950: 22). In Fromm’s view the story 
of Eden is a symbolic representation of this evolutionary process, in which the 
consumption of the fruit of the tree of knowledge is not a theological 
transgression but our embracing of moral freedom and emergence from the 
chains of mere instinct. Henceforth, we are subject to the physical laws of 
nature yet also transcend them. Our problematizing of existence and our 
development are not the result of an innate drive for progress, but are instead 
rooted in the need for an answer to our contradictions. We have lost paradise, 
and now wander alone, “tormented by a craving for 'absoluteness', for another 
kind of harmony” (Fromm, 1950: 23).  This drive results in our constructing an 
all-inclusive mental picture of the world as an existential and ethical reference-
point, and results in religious – again defined broadly - feeling and devotion as 
an expression of this. 
 
Fromm argues that there is no one without this need for orientation and 
devotion, and hence religion is ubiquitous. This, however, is merely formal, since 
there can be a variety of responses. The issue, therefore, is not whether one is 
religious, but whether religion develops our powers or hinders them (Fromm, 
1950: 26). Enter the psychologist, who – given Fromm's conception of the 
harmony between psychology and human flourishing – is interested both in the 
psychological roots of religion and its value (or effect on our powers). It is 
important to point out here that religion is a consequence of the psychological 
disequilibrium of Fromm’s Eden, and I see it as rather ambiguous as to whether 
it can hence be called natural (given that we are both natural and a “freak of 
nature”). 
 
3.6: Humanistic and Authoritarian Religious Types (Fromm, 1950: 34ff) 
 
Fromm then arrives at the distinction which grounds the whole text and which 
he claims penetrates all religious traditions: religion is either authoritarian or 
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humanistic (Fromm, 1950: 34).  Since I will argue that the nature of 
authoritarian religion is of immense import for the Merton-Fromm relationship, 
and also a point of contention in my own critique of Fromm, it is here that I 
focus, having first briefly presented Fromm’s understanding of humanist religion. 
This is “centered around man and his strength”, and the development of our 
powers of reason, our relationships with others, our recognition of truth, and our 
powers of love and solidarity (Fromm, 1950: 37). The aim of this sort of religion 
is to develop our strengths, typified in the essence of virtue as self-realization 
rather than obedience. Crucially, God here is a mere symbol of our powers, 
rather than a “power over man” (Fromm, 1950: 37).  
 
Fromm's case against authoritarian religion – anticipated in his treatment of 
Luther and Calvin in The Fear of Freedom (Fromm, 2001 [1941]: 33-88) – is given 
immediate force through an (unreferenced) Oxford Dictionary definition of 
religion as “recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as 
having control of his destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and 
worship” (Fromm, 1950: 34). Fromm emphasises that the external higher power 
is considered entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship on account of its 
exercise of control (Fromm, 1950: 35). What is crucial here is that this type of 
religion justifies entitlement in terms of control and power rather than any 
moral qualities or value. Hence, authoritarian religion supposes the right of God 
to force humanity into worship, and sees sin as our failure to comply. 
 
From these analyses Fromm elicits the essence of authoritarian religion, and its 
central virtue-vice distinction. It consists in “the surrender to a power 
transcending man” (Fromm, 1950: 35), meaning that obedience and 
disobedience are opposed as the marks of sanctity and sin respectively. This 
model, according to Fromm, necessarily conceives humanity as powerless and 
insignificant, only strong through submission. This is the theological correlate to 
the existential and ethical flights from freedom, by which independence and 
integrity are traded for a feeling of security. Ultimately, to avoid the dilemma of 
existence, the authoritarian conscience masochistically subsumes itself into an – 
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imagined - awesome power. In such theology – and its secular analogues – the 
rationale of worship is again not merit but entitlement based on power. 
 
We now witness an important shift in method, and the introduction of the 
particularly psychoanalytic flavour of the text. Rather than being content with a 
mere description of religious types, the psychoanalyst must “proceed...to the 
analysis of their dynamics” (Fromm, 1950: 49). This involves unearthing the 
processes – especially unconscious - which lead to the development of a religious 
attitude. Contrary to the humanistic religion in which God symbolises the 
potentiality of the higher human self, authoritarian religion entails the 
projection of the best of the human - “his reason and his love” - outward and 
the consequent impoverishment of self (Fromm, 1950: 50). I cannot overstate 
the importance for the present thesis of the specific psychoanalytic aspect of 
this claim: this religious attitude is mirrored in masochistic and submissive 
personal relationships, where the masochistic character is blinded by awe to the 
extent of the attributing of “his own powers and aspirations to the other person” 
(Fromm, 1950: 50). Surrender to God – conceived in authoritarian terms – is 
therefore a theological instance of masochism.  
 
3.7: Dynamic Psychology – Progressive and Regressive.  
 
Central to Fromm's argument is his understanding of the dynamic structure of 
the psyche, for which we can draw on The Fear of Freedom. Human persons 
have an interior dynamism, comprising inherent properties and laws towards 
development (Fromm, 2001 [1941]: 11). “Life”, that is, “has an inner dynamism 
of its own; it tends to grow, to be expressed, to be lived” (Fromm, 2001: 157). 
This drive entails a tendency to seek a satisfactory solution to the dilemma of 
life (Fromm, 2001 [1941]: 205) and hence is the power behind the positive 
approach to freedom. As is foundational for Fromm's later elaborations of 
humanism, “positive freedom is identical with the full realization of the 
individual’s potentialities, together with his ability to live actively and 
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spontaneously” (Fromm, 2001 [1941]: 232).65 
 
This dynamism, however, can also be the source of our submission, since it can 
be expressed in a regressive fashion as well as progressive. The need for security 
can also make us want to surrender our freedom (Fromm, 2001 [1941]: 4, 12), 
and adapt to social or interpersonal structures which offer refuge from isolation 
(Fromm, 2001 [1941]: 256). Hence our psychological dynamism can also lead to 
the development of the masochistic character. Fromm distinguishes between the 
phenomenon of masochism in sexuality and a more general masochistic 
character structure which he sees as the root of the former (Fromm, 2001 
[1941]: 126). The core of both can be found in the desire to experience 
weakness and dominion in order to flee from feelings of aloneness and the 
burden of responsibility by being subjected to an overwhelming other. The 
masochistic character is thus envisaged as a response to the need to eliminate 
the burden of the self and the anxiety of isolation (Fromm, 2001 [1941]: 130, 
133). Fromm calls this process symbiosis. This is arguably implicit in Fromm's 
critique of authoritarian religion, and involves the loss of integrity through the 
self being swallowed up and dissolved in dependence on another (Fromm, 2001 
[1941]: 136).66 
 
3.8: Authoritarian Religious Dependence (Fromm, 1950: 50-53) 
 
The main import of this for our treatment of religion in Fromm and Merton is 
found in Fromm's interpretation of religious dependence as a masochistic and 
symbiotic phenomenon. Here, life is determined by forces outside the self, and 
happiness found only in submission. This characterises the authoritarian 
mentality, in which “activity is rooted in a basic sense of powerlessness”, and 
                                                          
65 Burston describes this as “a continuing search for communion with humanity and nature mediated by the 
development of one’s powers of love and reason” (Burston, 1991: 71). 
66 Fromm claims that sadism is an analogous and inverse example of symbiosis, in which the self is 
swallowed up by absorbing another (Fromm, 2001: 136). 
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“means to act in the name of something higher than one's own self”, such as God 
(Fromm, 2001: 147).67 The importance of the notion of masochism in 
Psychoanalysis and Religion thus mirrors that of alienation in The Fear of 
Freedom, and Fromm continues the former by putting authoritarian religion in 
the context of the relationship to self. Since authoritarianism surrenders one's 
powers outward, it entails separation from self, or alienation. Since everything 
has been given to God, the dispossessed person must then turn to God to find 
self. Subsequent surrender in worship of this sort is thus an unconscious attempt 
to recover the lost self (Fromm, 1950: 50). However, since God is conceived as 
an absolutely superior power, authoritarian ‘worship’ necessitates a human 
demonstration of worthlessness. Fromm argues - perhaps failing to consider 
some of the nuances of religious humility - that this turns us not only against self 
but also against other humans, whom we view through the same miserable lens. 
 
To restate the significance of this treatment of authoritarian religion, Fromm 
concludes that the “real fall of man is his alienation from himself, his submission 
to power, his turning against himself even though under the guise of his worship 
of God” (Fromm, 1950: 53). The implications of this could barely be more severe 
relative to the work of Merton, as will be brought out in the following chapter: 
to turn to a divine power beyond the person is to turn away from self. I will, 
however, ultimately ask whether Fromm universalises a historical interpretation 
of power, since it seems that he is unable to conceive of a transcendent God 
being worshipped willingly based on worth rather than compulsion or evasion of 
reality. 
 
 
 
                                                          
67 Here Fromm refers to Friedrich Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence, having also interpreted 
Martin Luther and John Calvin in a similar fashion (Fromm, 2001: 55-88). There are question marks, 
however, over whether divine dependence is necessarily absolute, or whether some middle ground is 
possible. I will raise analogous issues in the conclusion to this chapter.   
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3.9: Rationalization (Fromm, 1950: 55f) 
 
Fromm subsequently develops the particularly psychoanalytic aspects of his 
method, emphasising the analysis of “the validity of thoughts and ideas” 
(Fromm, 1950: 55). Freud has shown human thought processes to be deeply 
ambiguous by unearthing unconscious dynamisms operating beneath seemingly 
transparent and sincere statements. Chief among these dynamisms for Fromm is 
rationalization. This involves the use of “thinking to rationalize irrational 
passions and to justify the actions of [a] group”, such that obvious truths may be 
denied or distorted in order to maintain a façade of reason around behaviour 
(Fromm, 1950: 57-58).  Whilst a traditional understanding of truth considers the 
content and coherence of belief systems, psychoanalysis seeks to determine 
whether a thought “accurately expresses one’s true inner state” (Fuller, 2008: 
209). 
 
From our particular perspective the otherwise important phenomenon of 
rationalization is of relevance only insofar as it pertains to Fromm's 
understanding of religion. Here, he argues that this “new dimension of truth” 
(Fromm, 1950: 60) is a compromise between the human needs for society and 
independent thought. Hence, rationalization results from the need to see our 
allegiances as reasonable in order to reduce the risk of isolation. It is thus an 
“expression of a basic dichotomy in man, the co-extensive need for bondage and 
freedom” (Fromm, 1950: 59).68 The resultant contribution of psychoanalysis to 
the study of religion follows from this: what matters is not merely to understand 
a person's conscious belief structure, but to uncover the unconscious processes 
at work in its formulation (Fromm, 1950: 60). 
 
Here the main point in Fromm's argument begins to emerge, concerning 
                                                          
68 Fromm's sociology emerges again here, since he claims that because of this herd-nature of most humans, 
rationality depends on a social order in which reason is normalized and thought can flourish unhindered 
and without manipulation (Fromm, 1950: 59). 
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precisely the validity of beliefs. The psychoanalyst searches for the “human 
reality behind thought systems” (Fromm, 1950: 62), namely whether they are 
“expressive of the feeling which [they portray] or whether [they are] 
rationalization[s] hiding opposite attitudes” (Fromm. 1950: 62). In sum, this 
approach seeks to understand whether a professed belief does not in fact mask 
feelings and attitudes which are contrary to it. Contrasted to humanistic religion 
and its striving for truth, the human reality underlying the authoritarian religion 
is “submission to power and lack of love and respect for the individual” (Fromm, 
1950: 63). We can see clearly here that Fromm's analysis of religion gives central 
importance not to conscious confession of belief, but to uncovering the basic 
reaction to the dichotomies of human existence, and whether this reaction 
cultivates freedom or evasion.  Rather than supposing that worship of God is 
based on corresponding human realities such as love, faith, knowledge, or truth, 
Fromm’s psychoanalysis attempts to uproot the unseen, unspoken, 
unacknowledged motivations behind it. The worship of (an authoritarian) God, 
thus viewed, perhaps begins to seem like an exercise in unconscious mendacity.  
 
I have gone to some length in elaborating Fromm's analysis of rationalization 
because he sees it as the primary psychoanalytic contribution to the study of 
truth (Fromm, 1950: 60). It is important to the present study since it provides an 
account of why the masochistic character structure we have considered above 
might frame its surrender in a structure of religious practice, or dogmatic or 
metaphysical theology, for instance. Rather than simply acknowledging symbiotic 
submission, surrender is veiled in rational justification. Our analysis of the 
authoritarian themes therefore depends on Fromm's understanding of the 
centrality of rationalization. I will, however, suggest that Fromm's work here is 
important insofar as we are dealing with a particular type of character, and a 
distinct type of theology and religion, and that Fromm might be accused of 
ignoring the alternatives. First, however, we will continue with Fromm's fourth 
chapter and its demarcation of the role of psychoanalysis within genuine concern 
for the soul. 
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3.10: Psychoanalysis as Cure of Soul (Fromm, 1950: 65ff) 
 
Having set forth his understanding of the basic religious types, and the role of 
psychoanalysis in illuminating the psychological roots of authoritarianism, 
Fromm now turns to a discussion of the place of the psychoanalyst in 
establishing the proper religious attitude in the soul. Since we have seen the 
early Merton's hierarchical view of psychoanalysis and religion, it will be of key 
importance for any harmony between the two writers to consider the place of 
psychoanalysis in humanistic religion. Secondly this will prove illuminating in 
considering the place of the Fromm dialogue in Merton’s eventual attempt at a 
revised, integrative position, as narrated by David Cooper. The particular goal of 
Fromm’s psychoanalysis relative to religion is for a person to see the extent to 
which any symptoms – e.g. compulsive or obsessive behaviour, anxiety, 
depression, or masochism – are rooted in the character traits of their 
fundamental response to the dilemma of existence. Rather than adjustment to 
social norms, then, what is needed “is someone who can help [the person] 
uncover the reasons for this waste of his best human powers and regain their 
use” (Fromm, 1950: 73). Consequently the genuine aim of therapy is “optimal 
development of a person’s potentialities and the realization of his individuality” 
in order to aid the development of freedom (Fromm, 1950: 74). 
 
Extending the empirical meta-ethic in Man for Himself into the sphere of 
religion and psychoanalysis, Fromm claims that “there are immutable laws 
inherent in human nature and human functioning which operate in any given 
culture [and which] cannot be violated without serious damage to the 
personality”. These laws are humanist since they concern the need and freedom 
to achieve our aims: “independence, integrity, and the ability to love” (Fromm. 
1950: 74). Whilst this is left on a vaguely formal level, it is clear that Fromm 
situates religion, psychoanalysis, and humanism in the context of what he sees 
as a natural human tendency towards self-realization, which each should nurture 
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rather than inhibit.69 
 
Having posited this natural tendency, Fromm comes to the main point of his 
fourth chapter: given the understanding of humanistic religion and the 
flourishing of natural powers, psychoanalysis is religious (Fromm, 1950: 76). 
Since Fromm's view of religion focuses on human development and solidarity 
rather than transcendent powers, genuine psychoanalysis and genuine religion 
are in harmony. Any hierarchy – contra Merton – is teleologically humanistic 
rather than theological.  To pave the way for a deeper comparison with Merton, 
we must briefly turn to the way that Fromm envisages the space that remains 
between genuine analysis and the authentic religious attitude. 
 
3.11: The Psychoanalytic Threat to Religion (Fromm, 1950: 99ff) 
 
With the utmost import for a critical dialogue with Merton, Fromm considers the 
extent to which psychoanalysis is a threat to religion. Psychoanalysis as cure of 
soul threatens authoritarian religion but nurtures the humanistic, whilst 
psychoanalysis as mere social adjustment extinguishes the humanistic but may 
be at the service of authoritarianism.70 Given this basic framework, there are 
also four different aspects of religion that the question must address: the 
experiential, scientific-magical, ritualistic, and semantic. I will discuss 
experience and ritual as the most important examples of these, before moving 
on to consider the dialogue between the two writers and eventually critique 
both. 
 
                                                          
69 Clearly many would question the existence of such a tendency, but this is again well beyond the scope of 
this project.  
70 The merits of psychoanalysis as adjustment are relative to the structure to which one adjusts, but it is 
clear for both Merton and Fromm that it is typically employed in the service of authoritarian power 
structures and conformity to mass society.  
72 
0704345  
In this final chapter of Psychoanalysis and Religion, Fromm takes 
experience to mean religious feeling and devotion, the genuine humanistic 
object of which is not a transcendent God but the human soul and its powers 
(Fromm, 1950: 99). As we have seen this is shared by psychoanalysis, and Fromm 
argues that humanistic religion is thus immune from any attack by natural 
science.71 Fromm does not dwell on this point, but it can be clarified by 
remembering Man for Himself, where the true science of humanity is based on 
an empirical observance of our reactions to restrictive conditions. Hence 
authentic scientific work stimulates human growth, and only psychoanalysis 
conceived as adjustment to regressive socio-economic structures is a threat to 
this type of religious experience. 
 
Secondly, the prospects for ritual in a religion inspired by humanistic 
psychoanalysis depend on the distinction between rational and irrational ritual, 
which we have also witnessed in Merton’s psychoanalytic writings. Here the 
irrational is marked by compulsion and anxiety, whilst genuine ritual is a 
necessary and free expression of shared value structures and strivings. Humanity 
still needs ritual to express solidarity, but psychoanalysis is essential in 
uncovering the human reality behind it and whether its essence is the escape 
from freedom or the cultivation and expression of value and solidarity (Fromm, 
1950: 106ff). 
 
Hence, the question of psychoanalysis and religion turns on what aspect of 
religion is taken as paradigmatic, and in what form. The ultimate function of 
psychoanalysis with respect to religion is then both negative, dismantling and 
reconstructing. Psychoanalysis ultimately reshapes the theism/atheism dilemma 
into the question of humanism or idolatry (Fromm, 1950: 118-119). Thus 
reimagined, idolatry unmasks not material objects but the psychological 
attitudes which renounce freedom by projecting it upon external powers. A 
critical psychoanalysis thus exposes idolatrous impediments to true humanistic 
                                                          
71 Again it is assumed that natural science shares the humanist concern of Fromm’s psychoanalysis. A 
different interpretation of natural science might well disagree.   
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religion, and is in a sense a new and inverted negative theology transcending not 
the conceptual eclipse of the absolute but the alienating structures which hinder 
freedom. The central aim of this – and of all Fromm’s work on religion – is thus 
that we cease wasting time and energy on questions of metaphysics and theology 
and instead unite in condemnation of theological, economic, political, and 
interpersonal alienation, and thus emerge into genuine freedom. I will 
subsequently question whether Fromm is not in fact vulnerable to his own 
critique, having first turned to the dialogue between both writers.  
74 
0704345  
Chapter Four: Thomas Merton’s Reading of Erich Fromm 
 
4.1: Merton-Fromm Correspondence 
 
Merton begins his correspondence with Fromm in October, 1954, writing that he 
had read Psychoanalysis and Religion, and half of Fromm’s ethical study Man for 
Himself. The occasion of Merton’s wish to write, in addition to his reading of 
these texts, was an encounter with the writings of Karen Horney, which has 
prompted Merton to reconsider his prior evaluation of psychoanalysis. 
Recognising that he has failed to appreciate the best of current psychoanalytic 
theory, Merton writes that he now notices a 
profound agreement between the psychoanalyst and the Catholic priest 
on some very important points. I believe that this agreement ought to be 
noticed and emphasised,  because I feel that our two vocations in a sense 
complete and assist one another. I also feel that there is much in Christian 
tradition that fits in very well with the  general tendency of writers like 
Horney and yourself. (Merton, 1985: 309) 
  
Since this passage is arguably the first portrayal of Merton’s new – and 
abiding - openness to psychoanalysis, it is worth examining it, as it forms the 
basis for much of the work I discuss in this thesis. Most significantly, it both 
anticipates and sources the approach to a practical – and hierarchical – synthesis 
between Christianity and psychology.72 It is important to emphasise that Merton 
sees the role of the psychoanalyst as complementary to that of the Catholic 
priest, which is actually completed by the analyst.73 Moreover, the assertion of 
some harmony between Christian tradition and psychoanalysis would then have 
                                                          
72 In my estimation it is not the case that Merton’s approach loses its hierarchical quality, but rather than 
the main pole of it changes from Catholic ascetical theology to religion conceived in a more humanistic, 
integrative fashion and incorporating a variety of new strands of thought. 
73 Of course, the converse also applies. 
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remained deeply controversial to many in both camps.   
 
This harmony introduces us to the first of this chapter’s main themes: the 
“fundamentally humanistic” character of Christianity, inasmuch as it aims to 
enable us to be the persons we are “made to become” (Merton, 1985: 309). The 
salvific fulfilment of the Christian is found in an elevated and divinised freedom 
before God, contrary to any soteriology or metaphysics of absorption into non-
being. We have already seen the importance of freedom in the foregoing 
chapters, and will see it repeatedly in the following, but for now it is important 
to emphasise freedom in its eschatological dimension, where Christian life 
culminates in eternal freedom before God. I will examine the matters of 
humanism, freedom, and eschatology in more depth throughout this chapter, 
merely noting here Merton’s claim that he is in “full agreement with [Fromm’s] 
basic thesis on the humanistic conscience” (Merton, 1985: 309). 
 
This letter continues by further exhibiting Merton’s turn to humanism, as he 
agrees with Fromm that doctrinal divergences should not stand in the way of the 
solidarity of all of those who believe in the basic dignity of humanity, in the face 
of the debasing socio-political circumstances of the time.74 It is significant to 
note here that the standard of unity is love of “the value and nobility of the 
human spirit” (Merton, 1985: 309), since I will subsequently ask if the doctrinal 
differences in question actually entail a basic rupture in the understanding of 
our humanity. 
 
Anticipating, and perhaps providing a genealogy for, the themes that we have 
encountered in “The Mature Conscience”, Merton shares with Fromm his 
concerns and frustrations over the monastic attitude to conscience, and 
commends Fromm’s wisdom “about types of conscience formation and 
                                                          
74 See (Fromm, 1950: vii), where Fromm calls for the abandonment of framing human division along 
dogmatic lines and rather placing in the centre the question of care for humanity. 
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malformation” (Merton, 1985: 310).75 The difficulty for Merton in his monastic 
experience is the existence of a formalistic notion of obedience. Here some 
monks conceive obedience as entirely about winning approval, in contrast to the 
personalist approach we have already seen in Merton’s writing. With some 
difficulty – and an admission that the problem may seem fatal to Fromm – 
Merton strains to find this personalist attitude in his monastic rule, which he 
claims should not be understood in the authoritarian light critiqued by Fromm, 
but instead as spiritual, humanistic, and mystical (Merton, 1985: 310). Authority 
and obedience are not to be taken as the end, but as means to it. More 
controversial is Merton’s suggestion that the emphasis on obedience should be 
understood as pertaining mainly to the initial years of monastic formation, to 
guide the monk in his lack of knowledge, since the mature monk will be 
integrated and live in freedom rather than servility. 
 
In acknowledging the tension here, it is important to attempt to understand 
Merton’s predicament, since he is arguably dealing with one of the true 
paradoxes of Christian life and thought: how the notion of obedience –  here 
obedience to God mediated through the monastic structure – can be synthesised 
with that of freedom. It is not my intention to probe the fundamentals or history 
of this problem but merely to point out that it is precisely the notion of ceding 
one’s decision-making powers to another that might evoke comparisons with 
Fromm’s understanding of idolatry. 
 
Nonetheless, Merton does also take issue with Fromm on obedience, suggesting 
that Fromm’s experiences with Nazism might have led him to be too absolute on 
the notion of authority per se (Merton, 1985: 310). The monk is actually freed 
from menial decisions by obedience and hence is better able to concentrate on 
higher ends. Lest it be assumed that the prior paragraph on the Benedictine rule 
is an attempt to evade controversy we should acknowledge here that Merton is 
comfortable disagreeing with Fromm. Nonetheless, the picture Merton paints 
                                                          
75 On conscience in Fromm see (Fuller, 2008: 212f). 
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here – freedom from menial responsibilities – is merely one aspect of obedience, 
which had been traditionally conceived not as liberation from tasks but from 
self-will.76 That this is an issue with regard to Fromm’s humanism will soon be 
clear, as with Merton’s insistence here – at the close of his first letter to Fromm – 
that a robust evaluation of the mystical life depends on the existence of God, 
not as object but as “the source of our own being.” (Merton, 1985: 311). 
 
Fromm response to Merton’s first letter was swift (27th October, 1954), and 
contains clarification of his critique of authority, and hence an answer to our 
obedience-humanism question.  As we have seen, Fromm distinguishes between 
two diametrically opposed notions of authority, the rational and the irrational. 
Authority which is ordered to human spiritual development is rational, whilst 
irrational authority is exploitative in pursuit of its own ends. Furthermore, 
Fromm – reflecting his commitment to democratic forms of government – finds 
agreement with Merton that human development actually depends upon 
authority (Fromm, 1954). Hence Merton is correct to protest against an anarchic 
denial of properly understood authority, but also correct in rejecting obedience 
when it is not at the service of human development. Arguably, however, it is 
instructive that Fromm had to refer Merton to The Fear of Freedom to point this 
out, since the rational-irrational distinction is not clear in the texts to which 
Merton had access at this time (Psychoanalysis and Religion, and Man for 
Himself). Merton has clearly been a perspicacious reader of Fromm’s early 
writing, a point echoed by Fromm in his first response. 
 
I have elected to dwell on this first exchange, given that Merton’s initial letter is 
programmatic for his treatment of psychoanalysis and religion. This is especially 
the case regarding the themes of humanism and obedience, and implicitly – 
although with some tension – on the central issue of alienation. Merton’s 
correspondence with Fromm then becomes increasingly focused on war, since 
both writers shared a passionate opposition to the American-Soviet conflict of 
                                                          
76 See, e.g., (Garrigou-Lagrange, 1947: 365-378). 
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the time, but there remain some points which are directly important to the 
theme of this paper. First (18th March, 1955), Merton states that without love of 
humanity there is no love of God, again demonstrating the non-negotiable place 
of humanism in his thought (Merton, 1985: 311). Secondly, in the same letter, 
Merton touches on the theme of automatism, this time pointing the finger at the 
“several centuries of more and more abstract thought” by which humanity has 
lost its grip on reality (Merton, 1985: 311).77 
 
Merton continues this theme in his next letter (12th September, 1955), describing 
how he is concerned by the “falsity…superficiality and…fundamental 
irreverence” of the putative “return to God”, in which he sees the centrality of 
word and cliché, marginalizing “the Living God” (Merton, 1985: 313). This is 
immediately followed by praise of Fromm’s take on idolatry in The Sane Society, 
which although brief and unspecific will again be important for a critical 
consideration of the dialogue. The letter concludes with an important point on 
dignity – adjacent to Merton’s suggestion that Fromm’s historical account of 
religion is too generalised – with Merton arguing that Christian theology, and in 
particular the doctrines of incarnation and recapitulation “substantiate[s 
Fromm’s] idea of the dignity of man” (Merton, 1985: 313). Again given what we 
have seen of Fromm's work on humanism, I will argue that such Christian ideas 
are in fact contrary to Fromm’s humanist philosophy and understanding of 
authentic religion.78 
 
In December, 1961, Merton writes again to Fromm, touching on a variety of 
points concerning automatism, political tyranny, the threat of war, and the 
response of ecclesiastics who prefer theological trifles over genuine resistance 
(Merton, 1985: 317-319). Relative to analysing the coherence between Fromm’s 
humanistic psychoanalysis and Merton’s understanding of religion the most 
                                                          
77 This is also an early indication of Merton’s burgeoning interest in both existentialist philosophy and Zen 
Buddhism, in the emphasis on concrete experience over conceptual thought. Of course this might also be 
traced to the centrality of mysticism in his life, stretching back to his encounter with Aldous Huxley and his 
friendship with the monk Bramachari whilst a student in New York (Merton, 1975: 202, 204, 212-217). 
78 Indeed Merton suggest somewhat boldly here that Fromm’s work might well depend on a monotheistic 
foundation, without specifying why this is the case. 
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salient point concerns Merton’s remarks on the renunciation of freedom. Merton 
laments the Christian rejection of the promise of liberation in favour of 
surrendering their freedom to new tyrants, before writing that only in the 
service of God is true freedom. Fromm’s first response to Merton (28th October, 
1954) had made it clear that the correspondence between the two will probably 
always be in spite of differences around the objective existence of God, but 
nonetheless this point on freedom deserves comment. 
  
Given that Merton has claimed “full agreement” with Fromm’s humanistic notion 
of conscience and “profound agreement” (Merton, 1985: 309) between priest 
and analyst, we can legitimately ask whether the idea that freedom comes in 
service to God actually threatens such agreement. Fromm himself would perhaps 
formally concur, but to suppose that this was a genuine agreement involves 
equivocation. This is because Fromm’s God is symbolic of human powers, and a 
conceptual expression of human experience which develops throughout time.79 
Again, I do not mean to dismiss the dialogue, but simply to expose seemingly 
unseen tensions between Merton’s theology and his supposed commitment to a 
humanism compatible with Fromm’s. 
 
With regard to this, it is interesting to note that Fromm writes (10th September, 
1963) of a meeting with a variety of Catholic theologians, and reports of a 
“growing understanding for what you might call, in psychological terminology, an 
unconscious faith in God which you might find in the atheist” (cited in Merton, 
1985: 320). Merton’s next letter (8th October, 1963) describes how he “agrees 
with [Fromm] perfectly” on this point, but it seems to me to be a further point 
of contention whether Merton assumes that this is Fromm’s position or merely 
something that Fromm has observed among theologians (Merton, 1985: 321). 
There is nothing in Fromm’s letter to suggest anything more than the latter, but 
                                                          
79See (Fromm, 1967). In this text Fromm argues for a humanist reading of Hebrew Scripture, which 
manifests a struggle between a conservative-nationalist current of thought, and a liberal-universalist one 
primarily concerned with the unity of all humankind and the critique of illusion. Merton, writing to Fromm 
on 13th October, 1966, says that he is greatly interested in Fromm’s reading, and that a radical hermeneutic 
of the Old Testament is timely (Merton, 1985: 324). 
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it is also unclear whether Merton actually attributes this position to Fromm. 
Fromm’s position on God in these early writings will be critiqued towards the 
end of the chapter, but for now I shall turn to another aspect of the Fromm-
Merton dialogue, this time Merton’s response to Fromm’s War Within Man. 
 
4.2: War Within Man  
 
In 1963 Erich Fromm published a pamphlet entitled War Within Man: A 
Psychological Enquiry into the Roots of Destructiveness, containing responses by 
six authors (including Paul Tillich and Thomas Merton), and concluding with a 
final response from Fromm (Fromm, 1963, 1963b; Merton, 1963). Fromm outlines 
his account of two contradictory human drives, attraction to life (biophilia) and 
attraction to death (necrophilia), before arguing that these – including their 
socio-economic development – are pivotal factors contributing to the threat of 
global war.80 I will focus here on Merton’s response, in order to attempt to 
illuminate in more depth the question of psychoanalysis, religion, and 
humanism. 
 
Since Fromm’s paper discusses his understanding of the way in which social 
factors – including early development – lead to the personality types which are 
the conditions of war, and therefore involves his psychoanalytic theory, I will 
discuss Merton’s response in some detail. This is also a key example for the main 
trend of the first two chapters of this paper, reiterating the hierarchical 
relationship between psychoanalysis and religion (including spirituality) and the 
centrality of love of God in human freedom. Merton begins his response with the 
assertion that 
I fully accept Fromm’s analysis of alienation as it is hinted at here and 
                                                          
80 This should not be understood as a metaphysical dualism of necessary principles, since necrophilia – not 
to be confused with the sexual phenomenon - results not from nature but from inadequate nurture. 
Neither should they be understood as biological principles, but as character structures.   
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developed more fully in his other books. But I think this concept needs a 
great deal of further exploration, beyond the limits of sociology and 
psychology, even depth psychology. (Merton, 1963: 45) 
This profession of agreement arguably demands an analysis of whether the 
theological and spiritual content of Merton’s response actually destroys rather 
than develops Fromm’s theories of humanism and alienation. In light of this it is 
also of great importance to the question of a transition analogous to the ascetic-
humanist one argued by David Cooper. 
 
The basic point made by Merton throughout the response is that human 
fulfilment comes only with the integration of our potential for spiritual 
transcendence, rather than the mere mechanical exercise of biological 
functions. Our human capacities require the exercise of transcendence (to be 
clarified presently), since if “man acts only as a member of the human species 
within his limits as an individual subservient to the inescapable finalities of his 
common ‘nature’, he is still subject to the deepest and most radical form of 
spiritual alienation” (Merton, 1963: 45). This raises profound difficulties relative 
to Fromm’s radical humanism, which sees us precisely as mere members of the 
human species. Secondly - an at once more important and subtler tension – 
Fromm envisages humankind as fettered, conditioned, and impelled to act by a 
series of existential dichotomies which seem to me to resemble the inescapable 
limits referred to by Merton. 
 
Merton continues by commenting that without orientation towards and discovery 
of the true self, “beyond and above levels of mere empirical individuality”, love 
of life is absent (Merton, 1963: 45). Genuine selfhood is perhaps the key feature 
in Fromm’s writing, but there must arguably be a point of contention amongst 
our protagonists here: Fromm’s approach renders the belief in and devotion to a 
transcendent God one of the factors involved in the “false personalism” that 
Merton merely locates in biological reductionism (Merton, 1963: 45). Again this 
may seem an obvious point, but it is clear that to Merton it is not obvious to 
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concede that the admitted theological differences also entail a fundamental 
disagreement in the concept of humanism. 
 
The force of this objection is strengthened by Merton’s disavowal of the 
possibility of “finding life and joy in the mere processes of natural existence” 
(Merton, 1963: 46). This is perhaps of contentious relevance given that Merton 
refers to natural processes rather than merely natural existence, since it is 
arguably ambivalent as to whether existence transcends process in Fromm’s 
view. Nonetheless the fact that Fromm posits human uniqueness in terms of 
evolutionary development merits at least asking whether he would accept that 
there was anything beyond merely natural processes, and whether fulfilment 
was merely the development of a natural evolutionary process of self-
realisation. 
 
Indeed, I would argue that there is a tension in Fromm’s thought between the 
idea that development of self-consciousness and reason makes the human a 
“freak of nature” and the claim that we still have a natural tendency towards 
the development of rational and specifically human powers. Perhaps the 
question of the adequacy of merely natural processes turns on the concept that 
would be paired with nature. If the evolution of rationality is a breach with 
nature, as Fromm suggests, then perhaps there is room for agreement with 
Merton’s claim about transcendence of merely natural processes. If, on the 
other hand, Merton's “natural existence” is opposed to something beyond the 
natural world, “Transcendent” as Merton states later, then agreement on what 
constitutes life and joy is impossible. That Merton opposes the “empirical ego” 
(Merton, 1985: 45) to the true self perhaps only confuses matters further, 
because it is not clear that the former has a correlate in Fromm’s thought. 
 
In any case, the hitherto nebulous matter of transcendence is now made clearer, 
and with it our task, as Merton specifies two senses. First is the transcendence 
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of “the empirical self” in awakening and emptiness, the true self.81 Second, 
opposed to mere immanence is the “Transcendent”, a paradox by which we go 
beyond ourselves whilst yet discovering our ordinary self. Both the 
“Transcendent” and going beyond self would arguably be anathema to Fromm. In 
sum, Fromm’s concept of love of life entails for Merton not merely awakening 
but “unity not only with all beings but with the very source and finality of Being” 
(Merton, 1963: 47). Again it may seem trite to highlight differences which both 
Merton and Fromm acknowledge, but I do so in order to argue that these 
differences entail an unspoken fundamental rupture in understanding the roots 
of human alienation and hence humanism. Furthermore, we have begun to point 
to an enduring tension along the lines of the mainly historical one argued by 
Cooper. 
 
Finally, this tension is reiterated in Merton’s suggestions, first, that “man is not 
alone”, and secondly, that we can “respond to the mysterious grace of a 
Spirit…infinitely greater than [our] own” (Merton, 1963: 49-50). From Fromm’s 
response, we shall see that these two points encapsulate the tensions that lurk 
below the surface of the dialogue. First, it is clear that Fromm is deeply 
appreciative of Merton’s reading of his paper, finding him clear, fair, and 
insightful. Fromm comments that Merton is a “true religious humanist”, who has 
seen the importance of the human spirit in driving change (Fromm, 1963b: 55). 
Finally, he also applauds Merton’s insight into the idolatry of material 
consumption, and the dangers in believing that mere technological and material 
abundance is sufficient for human satisfaction. 
 
It is, however, on the matter of human solidarity that Fromm takes issue with 
Merton’s comments, specifically around the idea that the human person is not 
alone. Fromm gives formal assent to Merton’s proposition “[m]an is not alone”, 
but ascribes to it a different meaning: we are not alone because we are many, 
                                                          
81 This emphasis on awakening anticipates Fromm’s later work on Zen Buddhism. Thomson locates Fromm's 
first interest in Buddhism during his days at Heidelberg University between 1919 and 1922 before being re-
ignited in the 1950's (Thomson, 2009: 6, 16). 
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sharing in a common humanity (Fromm, 1963b: 55). In light of this difference, in 
my view, Fromm’s claim that in humanism he and Merton share an experience 
beyond verbalization and doctrinal differences appears vulnerable and perhaps 
platitudinous: the distance between Merton and Fromm involves precisely the 
matter of what a human being is and is for. Hence, in differing theologically, 
they differ anthropologically and ethically. That Merton’s recourse to an 
infinitely greater Spirit would perhaps exemplify Fromm’s masochistic 
submission - the idolatrous surrendering of one’s powers into the hands of 
another - arguably confirms this rupture.82 
 
4.3: Christian Humanism 
 
To penetrate deeper into this issue, we can now turn to Merton’s dedicated 
contribution to the topic of humanism, in a 1967 essay entitled “Christian 
Humanism”. This work is particularly illuminating because it exhibits Merton’s 
attitude and methodology towards the relationship between history and the 
present, and hence his attempt to outline the conditions for a progressive 
Christian humanism based on current questions and concerns (Merton, 1979: 
137). Merton begins by framing this in terms of an ambiguity, largely based in 
the tension between secularisation and theological tradition. Christianity finds 
itself in the dilemma of wanting to be faithful to its own historical sources and 
yet living in an increasingly secular world by which it is rejected it as an ossified 
irrelevance. Consequently, it lives in a culture which denies that anything 
Christian can be authentically devoted to human development.  Here Merton 
sees the temptation to retreat into a ghettoized adherence to the past to 
produce an easy answer – for instance, that the medieval theologians were the 
genuine humanists - which fails to provide the solutions sought by the people of 
today. Rather than merely retreating into an erstwhile harmony, Christianity 
                                                          
82 It is not difficult to verify the place of surrender in Merton's spirituality, both from his texts and his 
journals of this and the subsequent period (Merton, 1973: 5, 46, 70, 76, 80, 87-8; 2003: 44, 129; 1996b: 78, 
214, 277, 290, 303; 1997: 67, 188-9, 207, 218, 226). In actual fact this is ambiguous since we shall see he 
also writes of human creativity with God. Of course, with Merton I am unable to answer the question of 
divine and human freedom. 
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must instead wrestle with the “much more disquieting task of inquiring under 
what conditions Christians can establish, by their outlook and their action in the 
world of today, the claim to be true participants in the building of a new 
humanism” (Merton, 1979: 137). Central to this is Christians asking whether they 
are even suitably poised to understand the new questions of the day, let alone 
possessed of original answers.83 
 
Merton’s solution is something of a synthesis between tradition and the creative 
work of contemporary Christians (Merton, 1979: 138). Central to the importance 
of this essay for our present question on psychoanalysis, religion, and humanism, 
is Merton’s claim that Christianity has something unique and essential to 
contribute to the ethical, political, and economic question of the day. Decisively, 
this contribution is the Christian approach to human dignity and freedom, built 
on the idea of redemptive love in Christ. The problem of love, however, can no 
longer be met on the basis of individual activity or charity, since the answer 
must expand in proportion to the question: the scope of Christian love must 
grow to meet the global dimensions of modern crises. In support of his plea, 
Merton cites the Second Vatican Council, in its call for a new humanism based on 
fraternal responsibility and Christian participation in the building of a humane 
world. Analogous to our first two chapters, we might again see this relationship 
as hierarchical, given the centrality and necessity of Christian sources, and it is 
in this light that we must view both Merton’s humanism and his relationship with 
Fromm.84 
 
First, however, Merton displays his historical sensitivity, criticising any 
interpretation which identifies Christianity with Christendom and hence neglects 
to appreciate flux and growth in theological and sociological thinking. Pivotal to 
this concern is a critique of any notion of divine providence which undermines 
                                                          
83 This demonstrates Merton’s’ methodological inclusivity, and is arguably influenced by the correlative 
theology of Paul Tillich in its concern to draw the interrogative structure of theological discourse from 
contemporary concerns. Merton repeatedly attests to the influence of Tillich throughout his journals 
(Merton, 1996: 193,298,321; 1996c: 174; 1997: 317).   
84 Merton actually draws on Fromm's analysis of love in this essay, but to consider this in the depth it 
deserves would take us away from the present question of rupture. 
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the possibility of human creativity, instead understanding the task of humanity in 
the world as simply one of conforming to a predetermined narrative. Christianity 
– particularly in its biblical sources – is a dynamic religion, characterised by self-
realization and newness (Merton, 1979: 140). It is in this context that we must 
place Merton’s approach to humanism, since he firmly rejects any classical 
theological model – or theological humanism – which is simply a matter of 
conformity to a static and pre-established divine and eternal order. 
 
Merton subsequently begins to draw on his reading of Karl Marx, seeing Marx as 
justified in denouncing a Christianity which is fixated on a mythical future rather 
than a concrete and urgent present. For Merton, however, Marx is only correct 
insofar as his critique pertains to a legalistic and isolationist pseudo-Christianity 
which decadently renounces the practical and humanist imperative of its sources 
(Merton, 1979: 141ff). Instead, true Christian humanism rejects any luxuriant 
retreat into theological abstractions and merely trans-temporal horizons in 
favour of collaboration with real people and problems. Indeed, it does so on the 
basis of the New Testament itself, in which God is manifested in human activity. 
Up to a point Merton agrees with those who find human alienation within 
Christianity, but rejects the idea that this is essential, since it is found only in 
the legalistic deformity of Christian freedom. 
 
Here we come to the crux of the matter relative to the question of humanism, 
alienation, and the exchange with Erich Fromm, since Merton reads the texts of 
the New Testament as the antidote to religious alienation (Merton, 1979: 142f). 
Christian humanism consists in divine adoption in Christ, by which humans are 
made children of God and promised the transformative power of the Holy Spirit 
(Merton, 1979: 144). The genuine cessation of slavery is this liberation of 
humanity from enslavement to evil through the power of divine forgiveness. In 
sum, and indeed encapsulating the nub of the relevance of this essay to the 
present thesis, 
The whole meaning of Christian teaching is precisely that man is not 
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alienated from himself by this new relationship to God, but on the 
contrary, everything that is God’s becomes ours in Christ. We discover our 
true selves in love.  (Merton, 1979: 145) 
  
 We have arguably now entered the epicentre of the fissure I have 
identified in Merton’s dialogue with Fromm, and which I argue cuts through the 
idea of a shared humanism. Fromm holds that the concept of God symbolises 
human power and experience, whereas for Merton it seems more apt to suggest 
that humanity is a symbol and manifestation of the sonship of Christ, since the 
human “has now become Christ the Son of God” (Merton, 1979: 145). Humanity 
becomes a participant in something else, a divine reality, which arguably 
epitomizes Fromm's alienation. Of course, a theology of theosis, for instance, 
might argue that this need not be something extrinsic, but nonetheless the fact 
would remain that in this transformation humanity relies on something beyond 
itself, both in the sense of metaphysical transcendence (i.e. a power which is 
not to be identified with mere human power) and in the necessary for a revealed 
teaching. In a word, Merton’s Gospel essentially involves a rupture with the 
unaided exercise of human power - even if one ever-intended in the divine order 
- and hence any humanism patterned on it is simply inconsistent with Fromm's 
radical humanism. 
 
Secondly, and further illuminating this tension, Merton himself concludes the 
paper by turning the lens upon secular humanism, at least to the extent which it 
locates human fulfilment in the “purely objective application of science, 
without any consideration for living human values” (Merton, 1979: 149). Whilst it 
is clear that Fromm is exempt from this criticism by his concern for the living 
human, his understanding of humanism is entirely vulnerable to Merton’s 
solution: “[n]o humanism has retained the respect for man in his personal and 
existential actuality to the same extent as Christian humanism”, since God “has 
given Himself without reservation to man” (Merton, 1979: 149). 
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Of course, I should again state that Merton and Fromm clearly acknowledge 
serious theological distance between themselves. My point is to demonstrate 
that the theological chasm is also a humanistic one, which renders Merton’s 
affirmations of agreement with Fromm on humanism and alienation seriously 
vulnerable. To buttress this point, we can briefly consider Merton's theological 
treatment of alienation from another text written during the period of his 
Fromm correspondence. As presented in the entry entitled “Alienation” in The 
Thomas Merton Encyclopedia, Merton's The New Man sees alienation as the 
disunity with God wrought by the original sin of Adam and Eve (O’Connell, 2002). 
Only in Christ and in contemplation can humanity rediscover its lost unity. This is 
a clear contrast with Fromm's humanist hermeneutic of Eden, in which alienation 
results not from disobedience but from the emergence from our primal 
instinctual ties with nature and the evolution of self-awareness and reason. 
Clearly we have two separate – even mutually exclusive – understandings of 
human alienation, and hence arguably two separate conceptions of humanism. 
Before turning the lens back to Fromm, however, I will continue this by 
describing how the conclusion of “Christian Humanism” – written little more 
than a year before Merton’s death -  reinforces the tension, and indeed situates 
it in the Christian sources that Merton claims are authentically humanist. 
 
4.4: Christian Eschatological Humanism 
 
Merton concludes with a restatement of the transformative call of Christianity, 
of human participation in God's creative activity, by which we can become divine 
and transform the world in divine power. Merton suggests that this “perennial 
language” of Christianity – though it is not quite clear whether this is linguistic 
figuratively or merely in a textual sense – is trans-historical, in two senses. 
Firstly, it is not beholden to any “limited historical world view”, since it can 
transform and elevate any human philosophy. Secondly it is “timeless and points 
beyond history” (all Merton, 1979: 150, emphasis added). On Merton’s own 
admission this places the question of progress and human destiny squarely in the 
realm of eschatology. This destiny involves “full and conscious collaboration of 
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all man’s resources of knowledge, technique, and power”. This much remains 
consistent with Fromm's humanism. However, Merton adds that this also 
demands “the deepest and most unifying insight that has been granted to man: 
the Christian revelation of the unity of all men in the love of God as His One Son, 
Jesus Christ” (both Merton, 1979: 150). So, not only does Merton’s humanism 
point beyond history, it depends on the entrance into space and time of Jesus 
Christ. 
 
To elaborate on the ramifications of this for humanism, I would like to anticipate 
my analysis of another Merton text to illustrate how deep this eschatological 
fissure runs. In his “Final Integration: Towards a Monastic Therapy”, Merton 
describes how Christian eschatology entails “a disintegration of the social and 
cultural self, the product of merely human history, and the reintegration of that 
self in Christ” (Merton, 1988: 211). Hence, Fromm's self, born of the dialectic 
between positive and negative freedom, but also the product of interior 
dynamisms and exterior social forces, arguably lies sundered in the wake of 
Merton's eschatological narrative: not the narrative of the progress of merely 
human freedom, but that of the transformative and disintegrative encounter 
between humanity and a transcendent God. Hence the key rationale for my 
having placed Merton’s humanistic dialogue with Fromm in the context of his 
essay “Christian Humanism” and these passages on alienation and eschatology is 
that Merton’s humanism is built on Christian language and a Christian 
eschatology which is ‘trans’: trans-historical, trans-scientific, trans-temporal, 
trans-philosophical, and ultimately trans-human. Merton’s human person is ever 
contextualised by theologies of revelation, soteriology, and eschatology, which 
for a radical humanist are alienating, a sundering of the self rather than its 
realization. Humanity for Fromm is fully humanized in and for history, and by the 
mere exercise of human powers.85 Merton’s reliance on a power beyond time and 
space, beyond humanity, will remain for Fromm - even if the point remains lost 
                                                          
85 Durkin shows the extent to which Fromm's secular messianism is indebted to the Hebrew Prophets and 
Marx (Durkin, 2014: 41-70). 
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in the mist of mutual appreciation - simply masochistic and hence subhuman.86  
 
4.5: Critique of Erich Fromm 
 
However, from the issues that remain – and must remain whenever one is 
confronted with central theological questions – I would like to finish this chapter 
by finally questioning the adequacy of what I have suggested are Fromm’s 
philosophical and theological assumptions. Until now I have merely pointed to a 
silent fracture beneath the avowed agreement between Merton and Fromm, 
illustrated by Merton's theology. This has been a necessary in addressing the 
integration of psychological themes in Merton’s work. There is, however, scope 
to ask whether this divergence is also grounded in limitations in Fromm's 
method. In the foregoing chapter, I have left my critique of Fromm to a 
minimum, and, as previously stated, I will avoid the sociological, economic, and 
political merits of his thought.87 Instead I would like to approach Fromm 
critically by identifying some mere whispers which challenge his commitment to 
radicalism and reason, and ultimately aiming to propose an approach which is 
properly radical. 
 
First, we have noted how Merton wonders whether Fromm's approach to 
authority in itself is not coloured by his outright rejection of its degenerate 
totalitarian form. This arguably prompts an analogous question concerning the 
attribute that most informs Fromm's authoritarian theology: power. Fromm 
operates on the assumption that observation of an historical character structure 
connected with the surrender to a transcendent God necessitates that any sort 
                                                          
86 This is a crucial point relative to my use of Cooper’s argument, since whilst the language of world-denying 
ascesis is by this time a distant relic of Merton’s traditional past, I will argue in my conclusion that in a 
certain way the logic of world-denial remains in this and other examples of Merton’s eschatology. 
87 Thomson raises a number of points which specialists in other disciplines would be able to probe. These 
include questioning the process of characterising a relationship as symbiotic (2009: 70);  Fromm’s particular 
notion of scientific plausibility (2009: 131) and evidence base; whether Fromm aims at scientific rigour or 
writes to inspire individuals (2009: 138-9); and on tension between Fromm’s liberalism humanism in ethics 
and his socialism in economics, education, and politics (2009: 139-40).  
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of relation to a power beyond humanity is a manifestation of this character 
structure. The authoritarian character structure is thus assumed to be 
exhaustive of those who conceive a transcendent God. Arguably this is question-
begging, since if assumptions around the (non)-existence and nature of a 
transcendent God are based on the epistemological limitations that Fromm 
concedes (Fromm, 1950: 118), then any characterology based on these 
limitations is at best provisional and subject to these limitations being shattered 
from without, as is any theory of idolatry based on it. Fromm assumes that our 
present epistemological limitations are psychologically definitive, when in fact 
the limits of psychology are arguably empirical and restricted to the observation 
of a certain type of character structure in certain subjects. Instead Fromm’s 
argument rests on characterological absolutes based on a particular 
understanding of transcendence, a conditioned hermeneutic of power, and an 
historical theory of knowledge.  
 
I would therefore argue that Fromm's method is vulnerable to its own 
limitations, since the question of the truth of character structures associated 
with a transcendent God is relative not to our limited epistemological methods, 
but instead to the reality which on Fromm's account would be beyond name. 
There is consequently a gap in Fromm's characterology: between humanistic 
religion and pseudo-religious authoritarianism there remains a space for a 
humanism premised not on independence from the transcendent but on the 
hypothesis of non-masochistic union. Otherwise, we arguably yield prematurely 
to a prejudiced notion of transcendence, freedom, power, and ultimately 
humanism. 
 
About the existence and nature of any “Transcendent” I will opt for silence, 
acknowledging it as a mere possibility, but to do so must arguably leave the 
question of a psychologically sound character structure related to God also 
hovering between affirmation and denial. To say otherwise is to elevate a 
temporally conditioned notion of transcendence into a place of privilege and 
historical ultimacy beyond its scope and merit. More importantly, perhaps, is 
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that in Fromm we have arguably seen a major category error, a drift from the 
observation of a certain type of character and its relation to imagined 
transcendence to a further demarcation of the notion of power. It is assumed 
that any transcendent power could only operate in a fashion which despoils the 
person of responsibility and freedom. The objection that to state the converse 
submerges human reason in antinomy is in my view an indictment merely upon 
human reason rather than the possibility of an alternate power dynamic. In a 
word, Fromm's characterology rests on assumptions in metaphysical theology 
which assume the finality of his own epistemology, and which ignore the 
possibility of a divine power transcending the human and at the same time not 
necessitating symbiosis. That Fromm has observed authoritarian theologians and 
authoritarian gods belonging to the chronicles of tyranny in practice and in the 
history of theology is by no means fatal to the possible existence of sound 
characters relating to (a) sound transcendent G(g)od(s). 
 
Fromm's psychoanalysis claims to study the hidden reality behind thought 
systems by analysing the correspondence between sociological examples of 
character structure and historical examples of religion. This betrays a deep 
limitation which arguably should be associated with more metaphysical modesty 
on Fromm's part. Does there not remain, that is, a possibility of a yet further 
hidden reality underlying human motivation, entailing a yet further possible 
character structure relating to the transcendent? As to this I remain merely 
wondering, but Fromm does not, and consequently outruns his own limitations.  
In doing so he also assumes and arguably universalises a historically conditioned 
notion of freedom.88 Hence Fromm's radical humanism is not quite radical 
enough - if at all - since it operates under the veil of an unacknowledged 
ideology of autonomy. And secondly his theology is not quite negative enough - if 
at all - thanks to the strictures it places around the concept of divine power. 
 
                                                          
88 Thomson (2009: 140) questions whether Fromm’s humanism does not in fact group too diverse a range 
of thinkers under the same libertarian banner. Clearly more attention to and expertise with the sources 
than is possible here is necessary to address this hermeneutical question.  
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Having outlined a critical reading of Fromm's theology I do not thereby 
mean to propose that Fromm is wrong, since to do so would arguably fall into an 
analogous trap. Instead, I merely suggest that Fromm's philosophical theology 
and religious characterology depend – inasmuch as they go beyond the empirical 
- on a justification he cannot provide. Moreover, inasmuch as his assumptions on 
authoritarianism and masochism depend on notions of power and transcendence 
which have been exalted above their merits, these are vulnerable too. More 
seriously, in the ensuing vacuum we might be left to wonder whether it is not 
Merton and his eschatological transcendence which best befits the reality 
beyond our naming, and hence is properly humanistic. Again I am bereft of 
answers as to this or as to what any alternative notions might be, but to concede 
stupefaction is arguably genuinely radical, properly negative, and perhaps – but 
again only perhaps – radically humanistic.   
 
4.6: “Final Integration - Toward a ‘Monastic Therapy’” (Merton, 1993b) 
 
Before attempting to bring together the most important of the themes discussed 
in this thesis, a consideration of one final text is in order to help us see the 
position of the mature Thomas Merton on psychology in its clearest form. In the 
final volume of his published journals, Merton refers to an “excellent” work by 
the Persian psychoanalyst Rezah Arasteh, and notes that he is writing a review of 
the text (Merton, 1993b: 70). This review, later printed in Contemplation in a 
World of Action (and to which I have referred above), is an important 
contribution to the material relevant for this thesis for several reasons. First, it 
is one of few dedicated considerations of psychoanalytic theory that Merton 
actually published. Second, it was written less that nine months prior to 
Merton’s death, and hence can arguably stand as our most reliable testimony of 
his eventual approach to psychology. Thirdly, from my particular perspective 
here, the text clearly manifests the development in Merton’s thinking away from 
traditional ascetical theology and towards the inclusivity emphasised by Ross 
Labrie and the secular humanism centralized by David Cooper, whilst at the same 
time posing arguably fatal problems for both. Finally, the text also echoes the 
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existential approach to anxiety in “The Neurotic Personality…”, and indeed 
further solidifies the distinction between this anxiety and neurotic anxiety by 
seeing the former as a sign of health. This aspect of the review arguably 
epitomises Merton’s method of viewing psychology through a spiritual lens in 
order to communicate its significance to his readers, and again indicates that 
the only true antidote to anxiety is a genuine spirituality based on selfhood. 
 
Arasteh’s book, Final Integration in the Adult Personality, is based on a similar 
method – perhaps accounting for its appeal to Merton – in which the spiritual 
element which orders and completes humanistic psychoanalysis is the tradition 
of Sufism, particularly in the writings of Rumi (Arasteh, 1965). Psychoanalysis 
and mysticism ultimately share the same end in the final integration of the 
personality. This involves a preliminary disintegration, in which the bonds of 
merely social selves and identities are dissolved, leading to a period of crisis 
which only the emergence of the true and trans-cultural self can surpass. 
Merton’s reading of the text attempts to place it in the context of Christian 
monasticism, for instance in his call for the monastic community to re-evaluate 
its present neglect of the existential crisis and its consequences for full 
participation in the structure of monastic life (Merton, 1988b: 209).89 
 
So, in his “Final Integration: Towards a Monastic Therapy”, Merton commends 
Arasteh’s text as a model for the monastic ideal of human maturation, self-
discovery, and rebirth. He is most interested in the use of Sufism to sculpt a 
psychological-mystical synthesis in which the aim is “the final and complete 
maturing of the human psyche on a transcultural level” (Merton, 1988: 203). 
Again contrasted to the view of psychoanalysis which sees therein a mere 
method for adjustment to social structures, this maturing involves “psychic 
rebirth into a new transcultural identity…entirely personal, original, creative, 
unique”, and which is a necessary component of the fully developed human 
(Merton, 1988b: 205). Noting that Arasteh’s analysis is purely psychological and 
                                                          
89 Again this is judged a matter of the reluctance of monastic hierarchy to accommodate individual needs 
and circumstances within a generic understanding of spiritual development.  
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hence avoids theological notions such as sanctity, Merton relates the idea of full 
integration – perhaps cursorily – to that of the supernatural maturity of the 
Catholic saint for whom integration is supposedly assumed, before proceeding to 
describe what this final, transcultural, integration comprises.  
 
The integrated person apprehends life “fully and wholly from an inner ground 
that is at once more universal than the empirical ego and yet [is] entirely [their] 
own”, and which is cosmic and universal (Merton, 1988b: 206). This new and 
complete identity involves the identification with and acceptance of the whole 
of humankind, in appreciation of all genuine values and participation in the joys 
and sufferings of the world (Merton, 1988b: 206). This is the abandonment of a 
partisan and limited perspective, and sees truth, whilst one, as having many 
manifestations which can be unified “in a dialectic or an insight of 
complementarity” (Merton, 1988b: 207). It is this that Merton finds most 
relevant to monastic life, in its freedom from partiality and a fragmented 
perspective and in the development of a “fruitful existence in peace, in wisdom, 
in creativity, in love” (Merton, 1988b: 203). 
 
However, it is the context in which Merton views this incorporation and 
appreciation of human values which raises some questions relative to my own 
approach and sources, in its treatment of personhood and history. This 
unification of the various manifestations of truth is seen by Merton as a matter 
of docility to “the Spirit”, since its openness is also an emptiness and poverty 
which allows one to become “a potential instrument for unusual creativity” in 
non-action (Merton, 1988b: 207). Ultimately this liberation from a fragmentary 
perspective involves the disintegration and annihilation of the self, “a real 
spiritual death” (Merton, 1988b: 209). Of course, there are a variety of 
interpretations as to what this entails, and the motif of spiritual death is a 
common one. However, to demonstrate that this has problematic ramifications 
for the question of Merton’s humanism and affirmation of the world, we can 
simply consider Merton’s interpretation of how this mysterious dissolution of self 
relates to history, time, and culture. This is because final integration, viewed 
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from a Christian perspective, cannot simply be psychological: it must be 
eschatological.  
 
Echoing my earlier use of Merton’s “Christian Humanism”, his disintegration, 
integration, and rebirth culminate in “the transformed and redeemed time, the 
time of the Kingdom, the time of the Spirit, the time of ‘the end’” (Merton, 
1988b: 211). Again, it might be argued that there are ways to reconcile this 
eschatology with humanism, but the situation is arguably made critical when 
Merton states that final integration also involves the “disintegration of the social 
and cultural self, the product of merely human history, and the reintegration of 
that self in Christ, in salvation history, in the mystery of redemption, in the 
Pentecostal ‘new creation’” (Merton, 1988b: 211). This clearly has serious 
implications for any humanism which sees persons and selves as forged in history, 
culture, and society, and ultimately again renders Merton as trans-historical, 
trans-cultural, and trans-social. That Merton argues in his conclusion that the 
true solution to the questions of his time can come only from the Spirit must 
now prompt the conclusion of this thesis, in which I will consider whether this 
shattering of history also renders Merton trans-dialogical, trans-symbolic, and – 
perhaps most complex – trans-reflexive. 
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Conclusion  
  
I began with the intention of addressing whether the psychological writings of 
Thomas Merton could be said to integrate psychology and religion. Before 
concluding my attempt to do so I will reiterate the themes we have studied in 
these writings, emphasising the characteristics which are present throughout as 
well as any tensions. Subsequently, I will recall the criteria of integration 
proposed by Robert Kugelmann, the narrative elaborated by David Cooper, and 
the inclusivity argued by Ross Labrie, to ask how my study of Merton relates to 
each of these. Since Kugelmann’s approach is a general one considering the 
integration of psychology and Catholicism in the 20th century in the writings of 
psychologists, he will provide merely the framework of integration. Cooper and 
Labrie, on the other hand, each construct a hermeneutic by which Merton can be 
read, and hence function not merely as framework but as dialogue partners. 
 
The first chapter of this study focused on several Merton papers or chapters 
either dedicated to or explicitly drawing on psychology. Firstly, the 
posthumously published and somewhat frenetic “The Neurotic Personality in the 
Monastic Life” sees Merton consider the question of how spiritual direction in 
monasteries might utilise psychology. We saw how the paper is mostly concerned 
with recognising the symptoms of neurotic personalities, focusing particularly on 
anxiety, wilfulness, and the tension caused by the idealised self. These themes 
must be viewed in light of the main claim made by the paper, in which 
psychology is seen as a propaedeutic for ascetical theology. Hence, I have 
emphasised throughout this paper that – notwithstanding the problem of dating 
“The Neurotic Personality…” – Merton’s method is consistent with his early 
approach to theology, inasmuch as psychology is seen as a tool ordered towards 
self-denial and surrender to God, and the mortification of the flesh and the “old 
man”. The paper, nonetheless, is arguably commendable for its openness to 
psychological research and hence its willingness to inform and challenge 
traditional themes in spiritual direction with scientific theory previously 
considered anathema. 
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Secondly, in “The Mature Conscience” we see this trend continued in the 
incorporation of theories of child development and philosophical personalism 
into an examination of freedom of conscience and willing. The paper attempts 
to integrate findings from developmental psychology into Catholic moral 
theology, operating with the basic distinction between the mature and infantile 
conscience. In the latter, the subject acts according to the internalization of 
rote dictates, finding its acceptance and value purely in the fulfilment of these 
commands. Conversely, the origin of guilt is seen as failure to live up to the 
standards imposed. Crucially, from the perspective of Catholic spirituality, this 
produces an automaton who responds not to God but to these interior dictates. 
The mature conscience, on the other hand, has been formed – either by parents 
or having later entered religious life - in love, responsibility, dialogue, and in 
appreciation of its uniqueness and value. Hence such persons can act freely from 
the centre of their own being, rather than for the sake of maintaining security 
and approval. Again, this paper manifests Merton’s method of using – with 
Bamberger - both contemporary psychology and personalist philosophy to 
contextualise Catholic theology, at once deepening it and diagnosing its flaws. 
Once more, however, we can also see the hierarchical method at work, since the 
paper operates on the assumption that love and sanctity comprise inward 
direction by God. I have repeatedly argued that raises questions both for 
Merton’s dialogue with Erich Fromm and for the question of integration 
generally. 
 
Merton’s growing interest in and use of psychology is perhaps clearest in his 1961 
series of monastic conferences later published as Introduction to Christian 
Mysticism, featuring a chapter devoted to the relationship between spiritual 
direction and therapy. Mainly concerned with communicating the distinctions 
between counselling, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, and spiritual direction for 
his audience, I have argued that this text is particularly remarkable for two 
reasons. First, the work stands out for its claim that in many cases psychology 
occupies an indispensable place in spiritual direction, such that the role of the 
director is incomplete without it. This highly progressive approach to Catholic 
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spirituality is supplemented with another claim no less radical, since Merton 
suggests that part of the work of direction is to enable the person to rediscover 
and accept natural gifts which may have been rejected on entering the religious 
life. Here, we arguably witness a development in Merton’s psychological 
writings, insofar as we see the emergence of a hierarchy not of self-denial and 
sanctity but of appreciation/affirmation and genuine selfhood. This is one 
example of a recurring theme in Merton’s thought contrasting the interior self 
with the social self of adaptation or adjustment, and is perhaps of all our 
examples the most integrative. Again, though, the consistency of this new 
hierarchy is arguably rendered questionable by its place in an exposition of 
traditional ascetical and mystical themes. 
 
My third and fourth chapters focused on Merton’s reading of the work of Erich 
Fromm and his endorsement of Fromm’s humanistic psychoanalysis. I first gave 
sustained attention to the salient themes in Fromm’s work, emphasising his 
dialectical account of freedom and its application to the symbiotic or 
masochistic aspects of authoritarian religion as contrasted with humanistic 
religion. In the latter, psychoanalysis emerges as a method of curing the soul and 
facilitating the development of the full spectrum of human powers. 
Consequently, it aims at the cessation of the human alienation which results 
from subjection to the idols of politics, economics, personal relationships, and 
theology. That Merton at various points attests to being in full agreement with 
Fromm on alienation, humanism, and psychoanalysis, again demonstrates his 
thirst to inform his work with an enormous variety of thinkers and topics. 
Ultimately, however, my aim is not to establish this, but instead to argue that 
this prima facie agreement shelters a fissure which is fatal to it and perhaps to 
any secularising hermeneutic of Merton: his continual stress on surrender to a 
power transcending humanity, history, and culture. Having also asked questions 
of Fromm’s theological method and assumptions, the concluding parts of my 
fourth chapter reiterate the question of rupture with recourse to Merton’s 
papers “Christian Humanism”, and “Final Integration: Towards a Monastic 
Therapy”. In both of these, Merton’s incorporation of modern themes is again 
structured by Christian symbols, and in particular eschatological ones. Both 
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humanism and the place of psychotherapy in the emergence of a new and 
universal identity will be transcended, passing away with history and culture 
amid the coming of Christ. These papers are arguably of critical import, since 
they involve, respectively, the provisional nature of merely human world-views, 
and the disintegration of the cultural and social self. Rather than hierarchy, 
these manifest the rupture of human power and the power of God.  
 
Having emphasised the most salient points of my study of Merton’s writings, I 
can now turn to my interlocutors, beginning with Robert Kugelmann. In his 
Psychology and Catholicism, we saw Kugelmann’s four paradigms of relationship:  
separation, hierarchical integration; the second case employs a hierarchy in 
which psychology is ordered to the Catholic faith; psychology based on scriptural 
‘data’, and psychology as a substitute. I have attempted to locate Merton in the 
second of these, with further employment of Kugelmann’s criteria of dialogue, 
existential reflexivity, and symbolic mediation. Bearing these criteria in mind, 
then, I would at last like to approach this question of integration from the 
perspective of David Cooper’s historical reading of Merton: is the narrative of 
the transition from the world-denying ascetic to the radical humanist synthesiser 
visible in Merton’s psychological writings?  
 
Here it is important to point out that in reading Cooper we are dealing with a 
particular model of integration, in which the ascetical animus of the early 
Merton is tempered by his later love for humanism, personalism, and 
existentialism. Analogously we will be talking of the integration of Catholicism 
with a particular type of psychology, itself informed by the humanism of Fromm 
and others. Cooper argues that Merton develops a critique of an earlier attitude 
of contempt for the world, which becomes not an abstract and degenerate locus 
of the rejection of God, but instead an object of choice, concern, and solidarity 
(Cooper, 2008:141-417). Here secularisation is understood not merely as an 
historical collapse of religious authority structures but also as choosing the 
world, and acknowledging a legitimate non-religious cultural and social sphere. 
On this reading Merton undergoes a radical reorientation, in which he abandons 
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contempt and sees Christianity as compatible with a critique of modernity 
grounded in radical humanism (Cooper, 2008: 193,200). Crucially, this involves a 
synthesis of Christian humanism with the modern world, of which Merton now 
sees himself a part rather than charged with tearing down (Cooper, 2008: 207).  
 
Before attempting to apply this narrative to the texts we have studied, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that Cooper sees something of the chameleon in 
Merton, since he adopts a variety of guises depending on his audience (Cooper, 
2008: 218f). This proposed reconciliation is thus also seen as an ongoing 
struggle, and one which is consistently ordered by the idea that there is no 
humanism without God (Cooper, 2008: 193, 234). Nonetheless, we can arguably 
see evidence of this transition in the passage from “The Neurotic Personality…” 
(assuming its historical priority) to “Final Integration…”. This is clearly manifest 
in the mutual dialogue between theology, personalist philosophy, and 
developmental psychology, in “The Mature Conscience”; in the incorporation of 
a variety of psychological themes in the task of developing full selfhood in 
Introduction to Christian Mysticism; and in Merton’s new appreciation of a 
putative humanistic harmony and complementarity between religion and 
psychoanalysis in his dialogue with Erich Fromm. In each of these and in the 
later texts “Christian Humanism” and “Final Integration…”, Merton incorporates 
a new openness to non-Christian writings, and – arguably more importantly – 
gradually adjusts his hierarchy. This revised scheme now orders psychology to a 
religion emphasising the full development of human nature, rather than its 
mortification in surrender to God.  
 
That said, as well as corroborating this thesis, each of these texts arguably also 
supports a counter-thesis: rather than expunging contempt for the world from 
Merton’s thought, world-denial simply evolves, inversely adapting itself to the 
development of his humanism. This can arguably be seen in seed form in the 
manner in which Merton and Bamberger’s mature conscience is but an 
instrument for God, and in placing the development of genuine selfhood within 
the ascetical framework of Merton’s conferences on mysticism. Furthermore, we 
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have seen that Merton’s continued reliance on the “Transcendent” is not merely 
a theological fissure with Fromm but also an anthropological one. These, 
however, are simply glimpses of the tension that is fully exhibited in “Christian 
Humanism” and “Final Integration…”, a mere murmur of what I suggest is the 
lingering logic of contempt for the world, long after the language of ascetical 
theology has been abandoned. Juxtaposed with the emphasis in Fromm’s 
humanism on the liberation from surrender to idols, Merton continues to hold 
the world in contempt inasmuch as his humanism relativizes the very things 
which Fromm prioritises.  
 
In “Final Integration…” we see this tension most manifest in two models of 
humanity. In the first, therapy elicits a new and complete identity, psychic 
rebirth, identity with the cosmos, and the fulfilment of human powers. In the 
second, however, the human is but an instrument, which ultimately 
disintegrates and is annihilated by the levelling of human culture, society, and 
history under the pressure of Christian eschatology. In order to begin to answer 
the question of integration, therefore, I would like to ask: do we see here in a 
single text both poles of Fromm’s dialectic, both humanistic freedom and its 
evasion in symbiotic surrender? In other words, does Merton – both here and in 
similar fashion in his “Christian Humanism” -propose both emancipation from 
and surrender to powers which transcend humanity and human culture? 
Returning to Kugelmann’s criteria of integration, the Christian symbol system 
remains – relative to the world – regulative, final, absolute, and immediate. This 
means that even the psychoanalytic humanism of Fromm and Arasteh become 
subordinate to eschatology, since although the vocabulary of contempt is gone 
the logic and metaphysic remain: the destiny of human culture, society, 
language, and history, disintegrate and are consumed by a reality which eclipses 
even Arasteh’s new trans-cultural identity as something entirely unprecedented. 
 
This questioning of the symbolic mediation arguably also renders the dialogical 
character of Merton’s work in this field vulnerable. Although Merton clearly 
intends to both write and counsel dialectically, correlatively, synthetically, the 
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dialogue can arguably be seen to collapse under the eschatological pressure.90 
Dialogue, and with it the possibility of integration, are hampered by the 
symbolic assumptions to which they must give way - like the young monks under 
Merton’s charge and the imperative of ascesis – and which shape the dialogue 
and ultimately reshape the attempt at synthesis. Before addressing the question 
of existential reflexivity – clearly the most opaque of all given its essentially 
interior nature – I will consider the approach of Ross Labrie, who sheds a 
different light on the place of the psyche in Merton’s work.  
 
In his Thomas Merton and the Inclusive Imagination, Labrie emphasises Merton’s 
enduring engagement with romanticism, and the concern for unity that he found 
and developed there. Whilst an in-depth analysis of this text is beyond us, there 
are several points which can deepen our understanding of Merton’s psychological 
writings. First, Labrie distinguishes between reaching out to another so as to 
foster unity between persons, and intuiting the unity of being. In Merton he 
identifies a deep desire for each of these, as well as clear development in both. 
This framework is useful for us, again helping to illuminate the tensions that 
dissect the writings we have studied. First, we can see clearly that Merton 
continually reaches out, to new correspondents, incorporating new themes, 
being immersed in new ideas, and eventually new religions and a new continent 
in the twilight of his life. Indeed, Merton’s dialogue with Fromm epitomises this 
reach, as most clearly seen in Fromm’s appreciation of Merton’s reading of War 
Within Man. Secondly, however, the aspect of unity concerned with the intuition 
of being arguably reiterates the difficulty we have already encountered 
concerning the relationship between world and eschaton, as we can also see in 
Labrie’s consideration of how the unconscious and the psyche figure in Merton’s 
work.  
 
Drawing from citations scattered across a variety of Merton texts, Labrie makes 
a number of points which are of great interest concerning the psyche and the 
                                                          
90 I will prescind from any comments regarding eschatology and secularism generally, and merely discuss 
these in Merton’s work. 
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fall. We encountered Merton’s interpretations of the fall but briefly in this 
thesis, not least because he is silent on Fromm’s reading, and we are limited 
here to a brief consideration based on Labrie. The key points concern Merton’s 
understanding of the fall as an inclination towards sin which is inherited through 
socialization (Labrie, 2001: 73). Prior to society, that is, Merton – at least in 
places – supposes a pristine psyche, which it is the function of spirituality to 
recover. The fall then becomes the sundering of a primal unity, which 
nonetheless remains latent in the ontological substratum of the unconscious 
(Labrie, 2001: 65, 74). In other words, to emerge from the fall is to rediscover 
Paradise as a seed planted in the psyche, “the radical self in its uninhibited 
freedom”, where the voice of God resounds (Labrie, 2001: 120,133f). In my view 
this understanding of both psyche and fall reinforces the basic ambiguity 
between eschatology and world that I have been upholding throughout this 
conclusion. If the origin of sin and disunity is located in socialization, and Eden is 
rediscovered through the journey within, then arguably the psyche becomes – 
like eschatology in my other examples – a levelling of the social. What, we might 
ask, is unity, inclusivity, integration? Are these found in the sort of just world 
envisaged by Fromm, the transcultural person envisaged by Arasteh, or alone 
with God in the Eden of the psyche, where particularity and the effects of the 
social, the cultural, and the historical, are abolished? 
 
Of course, this tension I have found most clearly in Merton’s “Final Integration”, 
but arguably this is simply the most explicit declaration of a dialectic that runs 
through the works I have studied, and arguably remains unresolved. Here, the 
rupture is between time, culture, society, humanism, world, and their 
disintegration in God, Christ, the “Transcendent”, and the eschatological. The 
criteria employed by Robert Kugelmann are thereby rendered somewhat suspect 
and ambivalent when applied to Thomas Merton. The concept of dialogue, whilst 
clearly an intention of Merton’s throughout his life and work, might be said to 
suffer from both ascetical imperatives and eschatological assumptions. This, 
secondly, is a matter which redounds on the adequacy of Merton’s awareness of 
the conditioned nature of symbolic mediation. Although he is clearly deeply 
sensitive to the need to and the difficulty of understanding different cultures, 
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the Christian symbol ultimately renders all others relative, subordinate, and 
transitory, in its eschatological absoluteness.  
 
Concerning Kugelmann’s final criterion, however, I have largely operated with 
the idea that Merton’s existential reflexivity is beyond reproach. This is without 
doubt the greatest mystery, requiring insight into Merton’s inner world that I do 
not possess, and thus I have refrained from any analysis of this sort. Perhaps, 
however, my consideration of Merton’s work might shed some light on the depth 
of the reflexive aspect. I have alluded above to the possibility that the Fromm’s 
dialectic of freedom can help us interpret Merton’s psychological writings. I will 
conclude by leaving the analogous possibility lingering that Merton’s attempt to 
integrate psychology and religion is also haunted by Karen Horney’s dialectic of 
inner conflict:  the struggle to reflexively reconcile in himself the roles of 
eschatological prophet and cosmopolitan humanist.  
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